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ABSTRACT
This investigation of the Combat Air Patrol stationing problem analyzes the
geometry of a hypothetical tactical scenario. Expressions to determine the following
quantities are derived: (1) the minimum early warning radar detection range required
for intercept feasibility; (2) intercept range as measured from the target area position
when the interception begins from the CAP station; and (3) the minimum number
of interceptors required to actively maintain one CAP station; The time variables
most relevant to the problem are identified and investigated in the context of
interceptor fuel consumption.
The complexities of the dynamic process embedded in a Combat Air Patrol
management are modelled by means of a deterministic macro model. The state
variables portraying both the logistic and the operational aspects involving the CAP
activity are defined; system parameters controlling the transition flow from one state
to another are presented to represent the constraints of realities. A method for
computing the attrition rate based on Bonder and Farrell's methodology is derived.
Numerical examples are presented and the results analyzed. The application of such
a CAP stationing analysis model for air defense planning is discussed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Effective planning decisions for best use of sparse defensive assets in a forward
air defense scenario require both proper analysis and thorough understanding of how
attack and defense interact. These interactions occur in many different ways, most
of them requiring a specific analysis appropriate to the context. Such analysis will
offer improved understanding of the capabilities, and specific weaknesses of the
resources available to accomplish a given mission. It will thereby contribute to
realistic planning and should lead to appropriate tactical decisions.
This thesis is a study on the Combat Air Patrol (CAP) location problem in a
Forward Air Defense (FAD) scenario.
A. SCENARIO
A set of sensitive points located in a specified geographical location called target
area must be defended against air attacks. The air attacks are of the penetration--
strike type of attack performed by fighter-bomber aircraft, which arrive at the target
area through a known sector of penetration. There is an integrated air defense
systein (IADS) to protect the target area from these air attacks. This system
comprises a set of ground-based anti-air weapons located in the target area, an
integrated air defense network that provides early warning radar (EWR) detection
and C3 capabilities, and a given number of air interceptor fighters deployed in an
air base with specified location. Each air interceptor fighter departs from the air base
and is kept in Combat Air Patrol (CAP) in a position called CAP station located
forward into the sector of penetration. From the CAP station, the air interceptor
fighter is either engaged in the interception of an arriving raid, or he returns to the
air base if no raid appears during the period of time he can stay on CAP station.
Around the target area there is a volume of air space determined by the effective
range of the anti-air weapons defending the area. The air interceptor fighters must
not fly through this air space volume to avoid being shot at by friendly weapons. To
accomplish their mission the fighters must destroy or neutralize as many as possible
of the attacker aircraft at or before the perimeter of this volume.
B. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Considering the scenario described above, the problem to be addressed in this
study is described as follows:
Given:
the location of the target area;
the location of the air base;
the angular sector of raid penetration measured with center at the target area
location;
the early warning range of the radar net measured from the target area location;
the effective range of the anti-air weapons defending the target area; and,
the maximum number of air interceptor fighters available in the defense inventory,
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determine the location to place the CAP station so as to maximize the expected
number of raids destroyed/neutralized by the air interceptor fighters, before the raids
reach the anti-air ,efeise line.
C. OBJECTIVES
The objectives cf this study are:
1. to analyze the problem as stated above and identify the key factors affecting
the selection of CAP station location;
2. to derive a deterministic model by means of a system of differential equations
representing the scenario in scope;
3. to use the deterministic model to assess how the identified key factors impact





Air interceptor fighters are used in the air defense mission in two distinct ways:
as Ground Alert Interceptors (GAI) or in forward Combat Air Patrols (CAP). Shaw
[Ref. 1] gives a description of the aspects to be considered for each of thcse options.
According to Shaw the selection of which mode to use depends on the situation
at hand. Factors to be considered in making this decision are:
(1) type of raid expected;
(2) number of targets to protect;
(3) degree of certainty about the attacker's approaching route;
(4) early warning distance;
(5) characteristics, performance and availability of the air interceptor fighters, and,
(6) threat characteristics such as attacker's air speed and weapons release range.
One reason for using CAP is to achieve raid interception at an advantageous
distance from the target area, providing more time to destroy or neutralize it before
the raid reaches its objectives. In general, the employment of CAP is more expensive
than ground-based intercept because of the fuel consumption and crew requirements
to maintain airborne defensive posture for prolonged periods betweea attacks; also,
it makes the air defense problem more complex as it demands extra capability from
the C3 system. The use of CAP may be in, fLicient and ineffective if it is not
4
.appropriately deployed and managed, yet it can be very effective under the right
operating parameters. It is the purpose of the analysis to identify those operating
parame:ers for a proper tactical disposition. Sometimes establishment of CAP is the
on]; viable alternative for the decision maker, as would be the case if the early
warning distance of an attack is expected to be insufficient to launch a GAI and
intercept the raid at useful range from the target. Again, analysis should be
performed to decide upon a wise CAP disposition.
Once the decision for CAP employment is made one contemplates the following
issues:
(1) the distance from target to CAP station,
(2) the CAP altitude;
(3) patrol technique; and
(4) command-and-control-specific procedures.
The practical distance from target to CAP depends on factors such as the
number of aircraft available, the area that must be covered, and the useful time on
station for the patrolling aircraft. These factors are affected, respectively,
by the logistics of the Air Intercept Squadron, by the performance of the interceptors'
on-board sensors, and by the endurance of the interceptors and air-refuelling
possibilities.
"The choice of CAP altitude must consider the expected altitude of the threat,
the interceptor's weapons system characteristics, and environmental conditions. This
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choice must be made so as to optimize the chances of the intruder detection, and the
thwarting of his attack.
The considerations involved in selecting the patrol technique for the CAP are:
endurance; optimization of sensor and visual coverage; weapons capabilities; and
defense against attack by enemy fighter sweep or fighter escort. Usually the defense
faces a shortage of aircraft to maintain what it considers an adequate number of
aircraft actually on CAP station. Nevertheless, a minimum number of interceptors
per CAP station should be considered. The number of aircraft per patrol is dictated
by situation assessment; two aircraft per CAP station is usually considered the
minimal force level on station.
The command and control procedures required to make a CAP effective may
be very complex and demanding. The CAP demands from the defense C3 network
the ability to perform long-range jam resistant target detection and identification,
long-range communications with the interceptors on CAP station as well as long-
range intercept control capability. Considering the fact that the CAP is not the only
activity being controlled at a time by the C3 system, both pilots and controllers must
be aware of any special radio-communication procedure for the CAP, as well of the
rules of engagement and type of control for intercept.[Ref. l:pp. 325-330]
-- - - - - - -
B. LITERATURE REVIEW
Some air-to-air models found in the unclassified literature will now be
presented. For simplicity, those models more germane to the nature of the problem
investigated here are described in this section. The description of others air-to-air
models can be found in Appendix A.
1. Air-to-Air Battle Models
A comprehensive study of the interactions between defense and offense
in the air-to-air battle can be found in Heilenday [Ref. 2]. Many aspects of an air
defense system and air vehicle penetration are analyzed. Therein the author begins
by addressing the basic concepts of the offense and defense missions, and discussing
radar and electro-optics (EO) fundamentals. Then the offensive/defensive
interactions are analyzed and the basic defense actions are identified as: initial target
assignment; airborne interceptor actions; and SAM/AAA intercept. The fundamental
elements regarding the air interceptor actions are identified and represented as time
measures and probabilities. A model for the probability of an air interceptor (AI) to
kill a penetrator with a single shot (PK) is given as a combination of conditional
probabilities, as follows:
PK = P., Pv Pd Pt Pe P, SSPK
where:
P. , Probability Al available and alerted;
P, Probability AI is correctly vectored, given that it has been alerted;
Pd Probability Al detects, given correct vectoring;
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P, m Probability AI properly tracks, given detection;
Pc a Probability Al converts, given track;
Pn m Probability AI launches weapon, given conversion;
SSPK E Single Shot Kill Probability for one shot [Ref. 2:p. 9-6]
The ways an interceptor may attack a penetrator are described according three
different attack patterns:
Radar Head-on - a head-on approach using the Al radar as the sensor and an
attack with a salvo of two radar guided missiles;
Radar Tail-on - a tail-on approach using the Al radar as the sensor and an attack
with a salvo of two radar guided missiles;
Infra-red (IR)/Visual - a tail-on approach using EO sensors (mR/visual) and an
attack with a salvo of two IR missiles [Ref. 2:p. 9-11].
Based on these attack patterns, attrition models are derived. First a one-on-one Pk
is presented for each initial attack pattern attempt, and considering a initial head-on
attack and a initial tail-on attack. For each of these initial attacks, subsequent
reattacks are considered depending on fuel and ammunition availability on the Al.
The models are as following:
PkT/E = PdT/E (1 - PST/IR PST/un}
PkH/E = PdH/E {1 - PSH/IR PSHInw PST/IR PST/pn}
PkT/R = PdT/R {( - PST/R PST/IR PST/pn}
PkH/R = PdH/R (1 - PSH/R PST/R PST/IR PST/In}
where:
PkT/E a one-on-one probability of penetrator kill by a single Al beginning with an
attempted Tail-on Electro-optical detection;
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PkH/En one-on-one probability of penetrator kill by a single AI beginning with an
attempted Head-on Electro-optical detection;
PkT/ u one-on-one probability of penetrator kill by a single Al beginning with an
attempted Tail-on Radar detection;
PkH/ ,, one-on-one probability of penetrator kill by a single Al beginning with an
attempted Head-on Radar detection.
In these models the entire sequence of AI weapons attack is considered as dependent
upon the initial detection (and track) probability, represented by the Pd terms in
each equation. The PS terms represent, each, the probability of penetrator survival
after each Al weapon attack/pass, what is considered as independent of the success
of the previous pass.[Ref. 2:pp.16-2 - 16-5] The author uses these models to evaluate
the results of each attack pattern under undegraded and degraded conditions. Six
degradation categories are considered, according to the possible penetrator tactics:
(1) Electronic countermeasures (ECM)
(2) Infra-red countermeasures (IRCM)
(3) Optical camouflage
(4) Evasive maneuvers
(5) Low radar cross section
(6) Lethal self defense
Heilenday also analyzes the scenario of many penetrators versus many Al's. To this
end, the number of AI assignments required to service penetrators is assessed with
and without considerations to defense resources and capabilities. The problem of
multiple air interceptor types is addressed, as well as the issue of multiple types of
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penetrators and the preferential assignments against certain penetrators[Ref. 2:pp.17-
1 - 17-20]. In summary, this is a comprehensive study of the air-to-air battle, with
detailed analysis of the defense/offense interactions, but the CAP station location
problem is not addressed by Heilenday.
Grant [Ref. 3] investigated the effects of command and control on the Forward
Air Defense (FAD). The study develops a basic methodology for modeling the effects
of command and control on the FAD. It is modeled from the Soviet perspective to
judge the effectiveness of the defense against a US penetrating force. In her study
a review of some FAD and bomber penetration models is presented. The main
characteristics of one of these models is presented here. A general description of the
other models studied by Grant can be found in the Appendix.
Corridor Penetration Model (COPEM) This model was developed at Stanford
Research Institute (SRI) as part of a study to improve the representation of airborne
strategic systems in aggregated effectiveness evaluation models. It is a sophisticated
analytic model divided into two sections: the forward air defense model and the
weapon/target allocation model. The model finds the probability a penetrator
reaches a certain depth in the forward air defense zone before being destroyed. The
zone is divided into a rectangular grid of cells, interceptors are distributed across the
grid according to some probability distribution, and penetrators enter and fly
through the grid in straight lines parallel to the sides. The number of intercepts
which can be made depends on where the penetrator is detected and how many
intercept attempts the control center can then make in the time remaining with the
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interceptors available before the penetrator exits the grid. According to the author,
the model makes the assumption that this process can be represented as non-
homogeneous Poisson process with a time dependent parameter and, for this
assumption to hold, in some cases the interceptor must be loaded with an unrealistic
number of weapons. For a detailed description of the forward air defense part of
COPEM and a discussion about the validity of the underlying assumptions of the
model, see Grant [Ref. 3:pp. 111-132].
In what follows we have the main aspects of a comprehensive investigation
focussed on the probability of an aircraft being killed in a hostile environment in
term of aircraft survivability. This work is presented by Ball [Ref. 4]. According to
him, the probability of kill of the aircraft is the product of the susceptibility and the
vulnerability, or
Probability of Kill = Susceptibility * Vulnerability [Ref. 4:p. 2]
In this context, susceptibility is defined as the probability of the aircraft being hit, PH,
or as "the inability of an aircraft to avoid being damaged in the pursuit of its mission"
[Ref. 4:p. 223]. Vulnerability "refers to the inability of the aircraft to withstand one
or more hits by damage mechanism, to its vincibility, to its liability to serious damage
or destruction when hit by enemy fire" [Ref. 4:p. 135]. Ball models vulnerability as




The probability of the aircraft being hit, PH, is the product of individual probabilities,
some of which are conditional on the result of a previous event:
PH = PA PDrr PLGD,
where:
PA a probobability that the threat is active and ready to engage the aircraft;
PDrr a probability that the aircraft is detected, identified, and Iracked by the threat
given the threat is active;
PLOD a probability that a threat propagator is launched or fired, possibly guided,
and either hits the aircraft or a high-explosive warhead is detonated sufficiently
close to the aircraft to cause a hit by a damage mechanism.[Ref. 4:p. 1]
The author gives a detailed discussion with respective model derivation for each of
the above probabilities for a comprehensive threat spectrum [Ref. 4:pp. 223-306].
Further, on the assumption that the aircraft has been detected and that a threat
propagator has been launched or fired, a model for the probability of aircraft kill
given a single shot, PyS is presented as
Pym ' p (x, y) Pf(x, y) V(x, y) dxdy
where:
p(x, y) w miss distance frequency distribution;
P1 (x, y) a probability of fusing for an HE (high explosive) warhead;
V(x, y) a kill function that defines the probability the target is killed due to a
propagator whose trajectory intersects the intercept plane at x, y.
Equations for the P. of different types of warheads are discussed and
presented.[Ref. 4:pp. 315-319]. Next, Ball addresses the issue of one-on-one
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survivability, i.e., the probability that an aircraft survives an encounter with a single
threat, Pss, which is modeled as
PS/E = -PI/E = 1 " PD PL PKSS
where:
PD a measure of detection, i.e., the probability that the aircraft has been detected
(at least once) from the start of a search up to the present time t;
PL a probability that a propagator will be launched or fired at the aircraft;
PKss a probability of kill given a single shot, as defined above;
PrW Tm probability that the aircraft is killed in an encounter in which one
propagator may be fired or launched at some time t.
Based on the previous model, the probability the aircraft survives the N shot
encounter is then derived:
where i denotes the Oh shot.[Ref. 4:pp. 319-321]. After the encounter survivability, the
sortie survivability is discussed. A model is derived for the probability the aircraft
survives the E encounters on the sortie, Ps/, as following
E E
"PS/S = H IE 1 = I (i - PK(E)
-i. ii.l
where:
PsM survival probability for each encounter;
Pr kill probability of each encounter;
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E a sum of those encounters that occur as the aircraft flies through any zone
defenses to get to the target, those that occur near any point defended targets, and
those that occur as the aircraft returns through the same defended zone.
If more than one type of weapon is encountered during the sortie, the model for the
sortie survival probability becomes
= I i /P/)](J (1 PKIE)] . 71( PK/E,)]
where:
El, E2, ... ,Em - number of independent encounters with weapon types 1, 2, ...
respectively, and
(1 - PKIuj a probability of survival of the 0th encounter with the Ph weapon type.
[Ref. 4:pp. 321-323]
2. CAP Stationing Model
A formulation for the disposition of CAP station problem is found in
Naval Operations Analysis [Ref. 5]. The scenario assumed is one of a naval task
force in a mid-ocean location, where the aircraft carrier, at the center of the task
force, is the main target to protect. From the aircraft carrier the interceptors are
launched and kept on CAP stations from which they are engaged in the interception
of penetrators flying toward the center of the task force. Considering the center of
tLe task force as the origin of a cylindrical coordinate system the CAP stations are
located equidistantly on a circle of radius d from the task force center. There is one
assumption that drives the whole formulation of the problem, namely that the
probability of penetrator kill is a non-decreasing function of the range of interception
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as measured from the center of the task force. This means that the further away from
the protected target the interception takes place, the higher the probability of killing
the penetrator. The distribution of the probability of killing the penetrator given the
interception range is assumed to be a user-supplied function. Another underlying
fact upon which the formulation is based is that the radar horizontal first-detection
range is a random variable whose density function is known. Based on these facts,
an expression is derived for the interception range as a function of both the first
horizontal detection range and the CAP station location relative to the task force
center. In the derivation of this expression the interceptor is assumed to be flying at
the same air speed as the penetrator. Having the interception range thus expressed
and assuming that the raids are equally likely to approach from any direction, the
expected probability of kill is then derived as a function of the number of CAP
stations and of the distance of CAP station from the task force center.[Ref. 5:pp. 220-
223] The strength of this formulation is the fact that it express the probability of
penetrator kill as a function of CAP station distance from the target to be protected
as well as a function of the number of CAP stations used, which is likely to be a
useful tool for planning purposes. On the other hand, by assuming, in the derivation,
that interceptor and penetrator fly both at the same air speed, the solution loses
generality. Other aspects not considered in this model are the endurance, and the
maximum intercept range, of the interceptor. In the next chapter an expression for
the interception range will be derived where different air speeds for interceptor and
penetrator are considered.
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III. CAP STATIONING ANALYSIS
The scenario described in Chapter I will be used as framework for developing
a model which permits investigation of the CAP stationing problem.
The first issue to address in this problem is to be able to identify the situations
in which the use of the interceptors in a CAP disposition is actually required. Once
the necessity of CAP is verified the next question to answer is how many CAP
stations could be permanently activated, given the number of interceptors available.
Before these two issues are addressed we will define the variables to be used in the
formulations.
A. VARIABLES DEFINITION
Let us define the following variables:
v. air speed of the attacker aircraft;
vi air speed of the interceptor aircraft;
tp w time elapsed from the moment the attacker is first detected by the radar until
it is positively identified as a hostile;
t* z time elapsed from the moment an interceptor in GAI posture is scrambled until
it takes off from the air base;
t. a time elapsed from the moment an interception begins until the moment the
interceptor engages in air-to-air combat with the attacker;
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tcmb a maximum time period for which the interceptor can stay engaged in air-to-air
combat with the attacker;
t, w length of time period required by the interceptor to fly back to the air base
from the point it finishes its mission;
t., m time length it takes to the interceptor to fly from the air base out to the CAP
station;
t* w time length it takes for the interceptor to fly from the CAP station back to the
air base;
tt, w time length it takes for the interceptor to fly from the point it disengages air-to-
air combat with the attacker back to the air base;
cR u number of repair crews available in the air base;
t* m time length it takes for one repair crew to repair one aircraft;
t- maximum length of time a interceptor can stay on station if no attacker arrives.
ta average time interval between two consecutive attacker's arrivals.
Now consider Figure 1. In this Figure consider the target location, T, as the
origin of a cylindrical coordinate system. Let C be the air base location. The
following quantities are distance measures, taken from the origin, T, of this
coordinate system:
R n radar horizontal first detection range, i.e., distance from the target at which the
attacker is first detected by the C3 network;
I w identification range, i.e., distance from the target at which the attacker is
identified as hostile;
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P - engagement range, i.e., distance from the target the attacker is when the
interception begins;
d * distance from the target location to the air base location;
tiatheW
bourduy
.. ..........i .... ... ... $ .. . . . .. ..... ... -$ .... !attack er
11 f........ ....... ...............
Figure 1 Ground Alert Interceptor (GAI) Scenario
h m anti-air weaporq effective range, i.e., minimum distance from the target at which
the attacker must have been destroyed/neutralized by the interceptor.
Let 0 be the angle formed by the attacker's flight path through the target
location and the line segment connecting the target location and the air base
location; 0 2 0. Define
tD u delay time measured from the moment of attacker's first radar detection until
the moment the interception begins.
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tD = tMD + tA•
Let
v.K = V2., K > 0
VS
K represents the air speed relationship between interceptor and attacker.
B. IDENTIFYING CAP REQUIREMENT
To identify the conditions requiring the use of interceptors in a CAP disposition
we will use the same analytical methodology as in Naval Operations Analysis [Ref.
5:p. 221]. The differences from that scenario to the one used here are: the
interceptor's air base is not located in the target area; the air speed of the attacker
aircraft is not necessarily equal to the interceptor's air speed.
In Figure 1 consider the air base located at B with the interceptors in GAI and
a reaction time of tl units of time. Further assume that an attacker is first detected
at range R from the target T. It will take tm units of time for the C3 system identify
the attacker as a hostile and scramble the interceptor. When the interceptor is
scrambled the attacker will be at range I from the target, and it will take tm units of
time for the interceptor to take off. Assuming that the interception procedure starts
immediately after take off, this means that the attacker will be at range P from the
target at the beginning of the interception. If the interception occurs at range S from
the target and considering the air speed relationship, K, between interceptor and
attacker, we can see that during the interception the attacker will travel a distance
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equals to (P-S) while the interceptor travels a distance equals to K(P-S). Applying
the law of cosines to the triangle we have:
K 2 (p - S)2 = d2 + S2 - 2dScos0
K2(p2 - 2PS+S2 ) = d2 + S2 - 2dScos0
K2p 2 - 2K 2pS+ K2 S2 - d2 + S2 - 2dScos0
K 2S 2 - S2 + 2dScos9 - 2K 2pS - d2 - K2 P2
V (K 2- 1) + 2S(dcosi - K2p) - d2 - K2p 2
S2 + 25 dcosf - K2p- d2 K 2 P 2
K2os - IK d2 -1I
2 (2
S2 + 2S dcs - K2P] + [dcos -K2p] 2 - K2 p 2  + 'dcosO-K2p]
[S+ ficosO -K2P~ (K 2 - 1 )(d 2 -K 2 p2 ) + d 2 cos29 2dcosGK 2p + K 4 p 2
I K2 - J (K2_ 1)2
after some algebraic manipulations, and solving the above equation for S, we get
S K 2P - dcos0 ± O K 2p 2 - 2dcosOK 2p + d2cos2 0 + K 2d 2 - d 2 (3.1)
K2 -1
Equation (3.1) expresses S as a function of K, P, d and 9. The first thing to
note concerning this equation is the double possible solution. Second, we observe
that, with respect to K, S must be continuous for all k > 0. Hence to find the value
of S when K = 1 we have to find the value of S in the limit, as K -, 1. Evaluating
these limits we find:
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limS] = P - dcosf + f(P - dcosf2 2P - 2dcosO
K-1 1 - 1 0
"•MS2 = P- dcos- /(P- dcosO) - 0
K-i -1 0
When K =1 the solution S, is not defined and the solution S2 takes an
indeterminate form. Because S has to be continuous for all K > 0, S, can not be a
solution for the value of S. By applying l'H6pital's rule on S2 we obtain the value of
S when K = 1. Hence we have the following expressions for the values of S
K2P - dcose - VK2p2 - 2dcos8K 2P + d
2cos 2 0 + K 2 d2 - d2
K 2 -1
if(K> O)A(K#1), and
S 2(P - dcos2)' if (K = 1) A (P # dcos9).
It can be verified that the above expression for S when K = 1 is consistent with
the derivations in Naval Operations Analysis' [Ref. 5:p. 222].
Now, to obtain an expression for S as a function of the first detection range, R,
we use the fact that P = R - tD . V. Substituting this expression for P into the two
previous equations, we get:
I See equation 11-5, p. 222 in that publication.
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S K 2 (R - tDv,) -adcos0
K2 - 1
(3.2)
IK2(R - tDVa) 2 - 2dcos0K 2(R tDV.) + d2cos 20 + K2d2 _ d2
K2 - 1
when (K > 0) A (K 0 1), and
S 2[(R - tDVa) - d-os0] , when (K = 1) A (R 0 dcos0 + tDV.). (3.3)
Note that when (K > 0) A (K o 1), S is defined if and only if the expression under
the radical is non-negative. This imposes a third condition on the values of K, namely
K d If 9 1 (3.4)
V(R - tDva - dcos0)2 + d2sin20
From the air defense view point, an interception is defined as a valid intercept
if and only if the interceptor is able to fire his weapons at the attacker at or before
the point where the interceptor's presence would restrict the use of other defense
weapons. This implies that the interceptor will have accomplished his mission if and
only if the attacker is destroyed/neutralized at or before a distance h from the target.
For this to happen, the interception must be completed at a distance from the target
such that there is enough time for the interceptor to engage the air-to-air combat
with the attacker and employ its weapons. Thus we can see from Figure 1 that the
minimum value of S that permits the attacker destruction/neutralization at or before
the range h from the target occurs when S = h + tcb'va (the rationale for this
22
expression for S will be addressed later in this study). This fact allows us to derive
an expression for the minimum value of the radar first detection range, R, for which
a valid interception is possible. Using again the law of cosines in the triangle of
Figure 1, we have
K 2(P - S)2 = d2 + - dcos0
and solving this equation for P we obtain
P = S + /(d - ScosO)N + S2sin20 (3.5)
K
To interpret the double solution of equation (3.5) we refer to Figure 1 and consider
the fcllowing fact. In a given moment aut attacker may be flying either inbound
(toward the target) or outbound (away from the target). Depending on the values of
K and 9 , it is possible for the interceptor to attempt a tail-on interception and catch
up with the attacker when it is flying outbound. But see that, in such a case, we will
have S > P V 0 for which the interception is possible. On the other hand, if the
attacker is flying inbound, we will have S < P V 0 for which the interception is
possible. In this study we are interested only on those cases in which the attacker is
flying inbound. Hence we conclude that the solution of interest for equation (3.5) is




~ . the minimum value of the radar first detection range for which a valid
intercept is possible.
Now, consider the two facts:
(1) the minimum intercept range for a valid interception occurs when
S = h + tcb.V,; and
(2) P = R - tD.V.
Substituting these expressions into equation (3.6) and arranging the terms, we obtain
Rmm = h + v.(tD + t•fb) + 4d - (h + tb v.) f+ (h + t]C~bv)Sin (3.7)K
We can verify that a minimum value for the first radar detection range will
always be defined because the expression under the radical in equation (3.7) is
always non-negative and, by definition, K > 0. Also, we can see that as K increases
(meaning that the interceptor gets faster than the attacker) the minimum value of the
first radar detection range needed for valid intercept decreases, what is consistent
with the nature of the problem. Hence we can conclude that, in a given scenario, and
for a specific value of K, whenever the first radar detection of an arriving attacker
occurs at a range shorter then R. as defined in equation (3.7), using the interceptor
in GAI will not make a valid intercept possible. In such case an interceptor on CAP
station must be employed.
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Now consider scenario like the one in Figure 2. In such a scenario the target
is at point T, and is considered again the origin of a cylindric coordinate system. For
generality, the air base is located at point B, outside the target area. The CAP is
stationed at point C, and at a distance d from the target. In the analysis that follows
the following assumptions are made:
1. the radar first detection range (EWR) is deterministic and known;
2. once an attacker is first detected by the early warning radar, the C3 system
is capable of maintaining radar contact with the attacker until either the attacker
is intercepted by the interceptor or he attacks at the target;
3. each engagemene is considered as an one-on-one engagement, i.e., each
interceptor engages one attacker;
4. the attacker maintains constant air speed through out the raid;
5. the interceptor maintains constant air speed through out the interception
procedure;
6. the interceptor can fly over the volume of air space defined by the anti-air
weapons effective range only on its way out to CAP station or on his way back to
the air base, i.e., he can not fly either through or over this volume during an
interception procedure;
7. the identification time, tun, and the take off time, t,,, are at their minimum
values, i.e., these quantities can not be reduced.
8. the attackers' approaching route to the target is not known with certainty, but
the angular sector defining all possible approaching route is known with certainty.
This angular sector is centered at the target position, and will be referred to as
threat sector;
2 Here a "engagement" represents the event of an interceptor intercepting an attacker
and, if the interception is successful, the air-to-air combat that follows.
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9. each raid is equally probable of approaching the target from any direction
inside the threat sector, and the probability of having a raid approaching the
target by a route outside the threat sector is zero.
The angle 0 is formed between the attacker's flight path through the target and the
line segment connecting the target position T, with the CAP station position C. This
angle is measured from the attacker's flight path into the direction of the CAP
station. An attacker is first detected at range R from the target, and because the
interceptor is already airborne, there is no delay due to interceptor's take off, so tA
= 0, and tD = tID. To derive an expression for the intercept range in such scenario
we apply the same procedure as used to obtain equation (3.2) and obtain




K 2 (R - tmv4)2 - 2dcos0K 2(R - tmva) + d 2cos 2G + K2 d2 - dI
when (K> 0) A (K # 1), and
s- (R - tva) 2- do2  when (K = 1) A (R # dcose + tmv.). (3.9)
2[(R - tIDv.) - dcos$]
Under this scenario, the constraints on the values of K becomes
K d sinO 2 (3.10)
V (R - tmv. - dcos#)2 + d2sin2U
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Figure 2 CAP Stationing Scenario
Once the requirement for CAP is identified, the air defense planner must
address the issue regarding the defense capability in activate CAP stations. This
matter is related with the defense resources availability. To this concern it must be
determined how many interceptors are required to activate one CAP station.
C. NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT REQUIRED PER CAP STATION
One factor affecting the maximum number of CAP stations that can be
permanently activated is the minimum number or aircraft required to maintain one
CAP station activated. Let a represent this number.
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Consider the scenario in which one CAP station is activated but no attacker
arrives. We will use this scenario to derive an expression for the value of a.
The first interceptor to go to CAP station takes off at time t = 0. At time t =
toc this interceptor arrives at station and, because no attacker arrives, it leaves the
CAP station at time t = tc + t, and flies back to the air base. This means that at
time t = to + t. the second interceptor must have arrived on station in order to
relieve the first interceptor, what implies that the second interceptor has taken off
at time t = to, + t, - tc = t,. This second interceptor stays on station until time
t = to, + t. + t., = tac + 2t, because no attacker arrives. Hence, at time t = to= +
2t. the third interceptor has arrived on station and for this to be possible, the third
interceptor has taken off at time t = toc + 2tn - to= = 2t. Meanwhile, the first
interceptor will be ready to take off again to go to CAP station at time t = toe +
+ tb + ti,, + t•; the second interceptor will be ready for take off for another sortie
at time t = to + 2tm + tc + tmP + t.; the third interceptor will be ready at time t
= to + 3t, + tb. + t=p + tx, and so on. This process will repeat itself until the
moment the first attacker arrives. A detailed description of the process is found in
Table I below.
Assume in Table I that tc > 0 and (tbc + tnp + tA) > 0. Under these
assumptions we have that aircraft number 2 will always be used because
(toc + t= + tj, + te + tAI) > tn, V t, ! 0.
Aircraft number 3 will be used if and only if
(toc + t= + tc + tm, + tAu) > 2t,, V t= _ 0.
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If (tm + tm + tc + tn + t~A) -g 2t., then aircraft number 3 will not be used. To see
why this is so notice, in Table I, that aircraft number 3 is supposed to take off at
time t = 2tin; if by this time aircraft number 1 is ready to take off again, then number
1 can be launched instead, and aircraft number 3 can be kept on the ground. By the
same argument, Table I shows that whenever
(tc, + tM + th + tMP + tAa) : (a - 1)tin, V tm (3.11)
then aircraft number 1 will be launched instead of aircraft number a. Based on this
fact we can use expression (3.11) to determine the value of a as a function of time.
From Table I we have
(a- 1)ti > toe + tM + ttc + tMP + tM
(a-1 toc + t,M + t÷C + tM + t+
tM
a , toc + tM + t• C + trp + ttA + 1, t1  > 0 (3.12)
to
If we consider that we are interested on the minimum value of a, and that a is
integer valued, expression (3.12) becomes





Aircraft# Take off On Hand off Ready time
time station time
______ _____ time __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
10 toe toc+ tm to+tl+tb+tM+tl
toe + tm
- = (toe + t.)+ tM
2 to + tM- tcc+ 2 tm+tb t~+ t MP + t
tin___ toc +2tm
to + 2t..i
(to + 2tm) +




______ c +o + 3t
(to + 3tin) +
4 to = to + 3 tmI toc+ 4 tm+tbc + tmp+ tAJ
3tm
____ _ __ 
___ 
____ toe + 4tm
[to + [toe +
(a-2)tmj (a-2)tmI + tm to + (a-l)tm, + c
a- toe + +tM +
(a-2)tmfp ti
___ __ __ (a-2)t, 
_ __ _ to + (a- )tin_ 
_ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _
[toe + toe + at, + tbc +
a (a-l)t. toc + (a- 1)tl]+ t,
tftP + tMl
I_____ (a-1)tm toe + at,
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a toc + tbc + trep + tAl + 2, tm >0 (3.13)
Let A represents the total number of interceptors available in the defense
inventory, and let N represents the total number of CAP stations that can be
activated. Obviously
N = r[() (3.14)
According to equation (3.14), if a is reduced the defense capability for using the
interceptors in CAP is improved.
Equation (3.13) says that the longer an interceptor is capable to stay loitering
on station before it has to fly back to the air base, i.e., the bigger tm is, the fewer the
number of aircraft required to maintain one CAP station permanently activated. t.
is directly related to the interceptor endurance characteristics, and one way of
improving it by using air refueling. Besides the implications regarding the value of
t.n, equation (3.13) also shows that a reduction on the values of tc, tb, t., and tm
also contributes to decrease a. The repair time, t, is a measure of the logistic
capability of the Air Interceptor Squadron in terms of Supply and Maintenance. The
interceptor reaction time, tA, reflects the air base infrastructure in supporting the
mission. The transit time out to CAP station, t., and the transit time back from
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CAP station, th, are both a function of the CAP station location. These two
quantities affect the value of a in two difherent ways: first because as they increase
the numerator in equation (3.13) increases, what makes a bigger; second, because the
further away from the air base a CAP station is located, more fuel the interceptor
will use to transit back and forth, and this will reduce the value of t., making a even
bigger. Notice also that if t. = 0, then an infinite number of aircraft would be
required to activate one single CAP station, i.e., it would not be possible for the
defense to employ the interceptors in CAP.
The above discussion shows that the time variables involved are driving factors
in the CAP stationing analysis. To analyze these time variables we are led to the fuel
consumption characteristics of the interceptor aircraft.
D. FUEL CONSUMPTION ANALYSIS
The analysis of the scenario in the previous sections shows that for better use
of CAP resources one must station tAP to provide optimum conditions for the
interceptor to accomplish his mission, while also minimizing aircraft usage.
To provide the optimum conditions for interceptor mission accomplishment
from CAP station intercept of an attacker must be completed in such a way that, at
the end of the interception, there are time and fuel allowance enough for him to
employ his weapons during the air-to-air combat engagement that will follow,
maximizing the total probability of obtaining a hit, cc -Apleted before he is forced to
disengage the fight.
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To minimize aircraft usage means to place the CAP in a positions relative to
the target and air base locations in such a way that the number of aircraft required
per CAP station is minimum.
On both of the issues above the fuel consumption plays a key role because it
constrains those problem's variables representing time.
1. Maximum TiMe for Combat (t,)
The maximum time the interceptor can stay engaged in air-to-air combat
with an attacker influences directly the probability of success of the CAP mission.
The probability of success of an engagement aggregates the probabilities of
success of many different events. Most of these aggregated probabilities are
conditional probabilities by themselves.
As we have seen in Chapter II, Heilenday [Ref. 2] presents a model for the
probability of an interceptor to kill an attacker with a single shot. Further he refines
the engage nent model so that the effects of tactics (type of attack) and technology
(type of sensor used in the attack) are also captured by the model. Ball [Ref. 4] gives
a plethora of survival models accounting for several different types of threats and
encounter environments. The models developed in these studies are a high-resolution
type of representation of the probable outcome of the air-air and air-ground
encounters. They are applicable to the air-to-air battle scenario whether or not a
CAP is considered. So, besides the advantages in fidelity representation, using some
of those models in this analysis would not help much in assessing the CAP
performance. Considering the purposes of the present study, we will focus on those
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aspects of the air-to-air encounter which could hinder the interceptor's capabilities
of killing the attacker due to the fact that, prior to the encounter, he was loitering
on CAP.
The most significant way the time on CAP impacts the interceptor's capabilities
is by diminishing fuel remaining on board at the beginning of the engagement. This
is so because the air combat that will follow a successful interception is the phase of
the mission where the fuel consumption rate is at its highest and the aircraft is at the
furthest distance from the air base.
The outcome of an air-to-air combat is highly dependent on many factors. Some
of these factors like training and skill of the pilots involved, the familiarity of each
pilot with the opponent's tactics, and level of motivation, for instance, are very hard
to represent in a analytical model due to the subjectiveness involved in their
quantification. Other factors, besides being suitable for analytical modelling, would
add -omplexity to our investigation without significant contribution to the conclusion,
because they are independent of the fact that the aircraft being modelled is on CAP.
In what follows we examine some aspects of the air-to-air combat engagement that
can be affected by the fact that the aircraft involved was in CAP.
The primary measure of an aircraft's air-to-air combat effectiveness is given by
its turn rate. The reason for this is that the turn rate indicates the capability of the
aircraft to gain a firing position advantage [Ref. 6:p. 3-24]. Turn rate can be defined
as the rate of change of the aircraft's flight direction [Ref. 7:p. 2], and is an intrinsic
characteristic of the each aircraft. The aircraft's maximum sustained turn rate
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capability at a given moment can be determined from its maximum sustained load
factor which, by its turn, is obtained from the aircraft's excess specific power at the
moment [Ref. 6:p. 3-24]. Expressions for these quantities are derived using energy-
state approximation theory and will not be discussed here. However, the interested
reader should refer to Shaw [Ref. 1:pp. 388-417], Nicolai [Ref. 6:pp. 3-21 - 3-28],
Fellers and Patierno [Ref. 7], or Anderson [Ref. 8:pp. 334-340] for more details. It
turns out that the turn rate is affected by the aircraft's gross weight, and the aircraft's
weight is affected by the quantity of fuel on board. Furthermore we can use this
parameter as a mean to determine the time for combat, tmb, a quantity connected
with the maximum time on station, tin, and with the a, the minimum number of
aircraft required to maintain one CAP station activated.
If aircraft A has a turn rate of *A degrees per second and aircraft B has a turn
rate of *B degrees per second, then it is said that aircraft A has a turn rate margin
advantage over aircraft B of i degrees per second iff.A - *B= i, i > 0. Usually the
air superiority fighter aircraft used as interceptors features better turn rate
characteristics than that of the fighter-bomber aircraft normally used for ground
attack missions. This is even more so if we consider that an intruder attacker, most
likely, is loaded with external ordnance. Hence, it is reasonable to expect an turn rate
margin advantage favoring the interceptor (if in a given scenario this is not the case,
the planner is cautioned to assess how this fact would impact the overall effectiveness
of the interceptors, either on CAP or in GAI, on the air defense mission).
35
Fellers and Patierno [Ref. 7] show that a desirable turn rate margin advantage
over an opponent aircraft is about 2 degrees per second3 [Ref.7:p. 7]. If we consider
such an advantage in a head-on engagement, and assuming that the combqt evolves
only with sustained turns, it would take 90 seconds for the aircraft -ith the higher
turn rate to obtain a definite position advantage in the fight. Here "position
advantage" means a spatial displacement between the two aircraft such that the one
in advantage is positioned in the rear hemisphere of it's opponent and the noses of
both aircraft are pointing in the same general direction. It does not necessarily mean
that the aircraft with the advantage has obtained firing conditions. Evidently, an air-
to-air combat does not evolve solely based on sustained turns, as other factors such
as pilot skill and tactics do interfere. Nevertheless it is reasonable to assume that, if
the air combat starts from a head-on engagement at the outset, most likely it will not
be terminated before this period of time. On the other hand, experience shows that
during an air-to-air combat engagement, as time elapses, if the fight evolves beyond
a certain period of time without any definite advantage to either side, then the
chances for a subsequent combat advantage definition do not increase if the time of
engagement is lengthened. From these considerations we can see that when the
combat begins, the shorter the time frame a pilot has to shoot at his opponent, the
less probable it is that he will obtain a hit. It is also reasonable to consider that, if
we consider the chances of obtaining a hit during an air-to-air combat as a function
3 Measured based on the sustained turn rate, i.e., a turn during which the aircraft does
not vary either altitude or air speed.
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of the time available for engagement, then this function neither is a linear function
nor does it increase monotonicaly with time. Notice that the time available for
engagement can be measured eithe- Rs a function of distance from the point where
the combat starts to a stipulated disengagement point (in this study this is
represented by the effective range of the surface anti-air weapons), or as a function
of the fuel available on board.
From the above discussion, it is clear that the time for combat, tb, is a factor
that impacts interceptor's capability of mission accomplishment. According to Fellers
and Patierno a "... constant combat time allowance has been standard practice in the
past, the magnitude of which has been based on qualitative judgments which have
been incorporated into military specifications. It is recognized that determination of
the total of fuel required for combat is difficult and somewhat arbitrary. However,
for aircraft with varying performance capability, it is more rational to compare them
on the basis of providing combat fuel to accomplish a given task rather than
requiring fuel for equal combat time." [Ref. 7:p. 6] This way of thinking provides an
heuristic for determining tab such that the interceptor is granted with the conditions
to carry out the fight with the expected probability of success.
First it must be determined the minimum combat time under representative
flight conditions, i.e., the minimum time for the interceptor to obtain a 180 degrees
gain in direction relative to a typical attacker under the typical expected air battle
arena (altitude and air speed ranges during engagement). Dividing 180 by the turn
rate margin advantage the interceptor has over the attacker gives an estimate of the
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minimum combat time [Ref. 7:p. 7]. To this quantity it must be added the planner's
estimated of the typical air-to-air combat time of engagement, i.e., the expected time
length beyond which the chances of obtaining a position advantage in a neutral
engagement does not improve any more. Usually this quantity is estimated either
based on a pre-specified constant number of sustained turns [Ref. 7:p. 6] and
translated into a time length , or it can be estimated statistically from field
experiments data. Commonly, there is an expected probability of success in the air-to-
air combat engagement associated with this number of sustained turns chosen to
compute tcb. This estimated probability is the parameter based on which the planner
makes his planning inferences. Next, it must be considered the fuel allowance for a
safe disengagement for the case of an unresolved engagement. This can be accounted
for by considering an extra number of sustained turns. Summing up these time
lengths one obtains a value for tcb, the maximum time the interceptor can remain
engaged in air-to-air combat with the attacker having an expected success probability.
Having a value for ttb, to compute the fuel required for this phase of the
interceptor's mission becomes straightforward.
Let p%, be the expected success probability in air-to-air engagement
considered by the air defense planning staff. Let t•b represent the time length the
interceptor can remain engaged in air-to-air combat with the attacker having
expected probability of success in the engagement equals to p'k. The quantity t'b
is calculated according to the procedure described above. Define S,. as the
minimum intercept range for which it is possible for the interceptor to remain
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engaged in air-to-air combat for t,.b units of time, before he reaches the surface
anti-air (AA) effective range line. S. is the minimum distance from the target area
that permits the interceptor to begin an air-to-air combat engagement with the
attacker with success probability equals to p'uA. To compute the value of Si. we
have to conjecture about the value of v. during the air-to-air engagement.
During the interception phase of an engagement, the attacker is moving in the
target direction at an average ground speed v = v.. When this phase is over one of
the following events may take place:
(1) the attacker keeps flying toward the target area at an average air speed v -
v1, v, = v., because the interception is not successful; or,
(2) the interception is successful and the attacker start maneuvering to evade the
interceptor but keep moving toward the target area at an average air speed v =
v2, v2 < V.; or,
(3) the interception is successful, and the attacker engages air-to-air combat with
the interceptor; in this case, provided he is alive, his movement toward the target
area has an average speed v = v3, 0 ! v3 c v . .
If we consider all the randomness present in the process that an air-to-air
engagement represents, it becomes clear that to predict or estimate values for v2 or
for v3 is not a simple task. Keeping in mind that we are seeking for a value for Si.,
an underestimation of v may lead to a value for S., closer to the target than the
actual distance required for the interceptor to have time for combat enough to have
PkI chances of success. If v = v. is used instead, then an overestimation is being
made, and the defense problem becomes tighter. However, by doing so, this ensures
that the interceptor can perform with p'A chance of success, and the air defense
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planner reduces the risk of allowing the interceptor to fly into the harzrdous firing
area protected by surface AA weapons. Hence, it is reasonable to use a value v -
v. to compute S.. Thus we get:
Smin= h + t*Cmb. Va (3.15)
As it was pointed out before, there are many different factors that affect the
probable outcome of an air-to-air combat engagement, including psychological
aspects as well as time/fuel constraints. However, if the air defense planner does
study the scenario and the opponent's characteristics carefully, the result will be an
adequate value for t'-b and the equivalent combat fuel apportionment such that the
interceptor engaging from CAP is granted with the optimum conditions for mission
accomplishment.
2. Maximum Time on Cap Station (t.)
As equation (3.13) shows, t., the maximum time an interceptor can stay
loitering on station if no attacker arrives, is a key factor to determine aircraft usage
in CAP. It is clear that t. depends on the fuel available to the interceptor at the
moment he arrives on station. To estimate how long the interceptor can stay loitering
on CAP if no attacker arrives, it have to be analyzed how much fuel he must have
on board at the moment he leaves CAP station to fly back to the air base. This
amount of fuel is sometimes referrd to as the "combat package".
Lets assume that exactly at the moment the interceptor is leaving CAP station
an attacker arrives and there is no other interceptor available. Then this interceptor,
40
who is just about to leave the CAP, will have to engage the arriving attacker. To
make this interception possible the interceptor must have, at this moment, fuel
enough to intercept the attacker, to sustain air-to-air combat for tcb units of time
and to fly back to the air base with a safe amount of fuel. If we sum up all the fuel
consumed from the moment this hypothetical engagement started until the
interceptor landing in the air base, we have an estimate of the minimum amount of
fuel the interceptor have to have on board when he leaves CAP if no attacker
arrives. Subtracting this quantity from the amount of fuel he has on board at the
moment he arrives on station gives the value of fc~A, the amount of fuel for loitering
on station before having to fly back to the air base. Having a value for fc. a value
for t. can is determined straightforward be considering the aircraft maximum
endurance schedule for fuel consumption setting.
There is one aspect in the above discussion that have to be addressed more
carefully, namely tti. Besides not being represented in equation (3.11) it is worth
analyzing because it affects tm.
It is clear that t. depends on the value of K, i.e., the interceptor/attacker
speed relationship. Equations (3.8) and (3.9) show the role K plays in the
interception geometry. It worth emphasizing that in those equations K represents a
ratio of average air speeds. Usually, if there is no threat in the scene, the interceptor
loiters on CAP station at or around the maximum endurance air speed for the
loitering altitude. This air speed is, most often, well below those speed setting used
during the intercept procedure. At the beginning of the interception an acceleration
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to a selected final intercept air speed will take place. Depending on the value of this
air speed selected, the power setting required to accelerate may cause a very high
fuel consumption rate what would imply in a greater amount of fuel being
apportioned to the interception phase. Because the air-to-air combat engagement is
the paramount phase of the entire mission, it is not prudent to consume the fuel for
combat during the intercept phase. Consequently, a high fuel consumption during the
intercept will cause a reduction in the fuel for loitering hence abbreviating tm and
increasing the value of a.
The impact of the intercept air speed on the intercept range was investigated
by Fellers and Patierno [Ref. 7]. To this end a typical situation was hypothesized in
which the interceptor is engaged from GAI with a scramble time of 3 minutes instead
of being engaged from CAP; an intruder flying at an air speed equals to Mach 0.9,
and a first radar detection range of 200 nautical miles is considered. This difference
in scenario does not invalidate the results for the present study. It was shown that,
if a tactical environment is considered, i.e., a first radar detection range is somewhat
limited, the intercept distance is relatively unaffected by maximum speed capabilities
greater than Mach 2.0. In Figure 3 below the data obtained in this investigation are
reproduced. [Ref. 7:p. 5]
Usually the intercept speed is chosen based on the attacker's speed. One
criterion for such a choice is to set the interceptor's air speed to values that vary
from 1.2 times the attacker's air speed up to the interceptor's maximum speed limit
[Ref. 9:p. 4-16]. But, as Figure 3 shows, a high setting of final intercept speed is of
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little value for the tactical intercept mission, in addition to the fact that it increases
substantially the fuel consumption rate. Hence, in order to increase t., it is necessary
to station the CAP in such a way that it is possible to intercept an attacker without
having to resort to high values of K, mainly in the cases when the interceptor is at
the limit of fuel allowance. As a heuristic for selecting a value for K in a given
scenario, expression (3.10) gives the conditions which makes the an intercept
possible.
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INTERCEPT RANGE vs FINAL MACH NUMBER
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Figure 3 Intercept Range as a Function of the Intercept Maximum Air Speed [Ref.
9:p. 5]
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IV. A MACRO MODEL FOR CAP MANAGEMENT
The maintenance of a CAP requires the management of various resources so
as to achieve optimal attrition of the attackers. The defending force will have an
initial number of interceptors, each with certain endurance and combat capability.
In addition, the aircraft will be supported logistically by a repair facility at their base.
Options open to the defence force commander are, among others,
(1) to choose the distance at which to station the CAP from target (and from
support air base);
(2) to select the nominal maximum number of aircraft on CAP;
(3) to decide upon the altitude at which CAP operates, and that at which the
intercept will be made.
All of the above choices are influenced by the endurance of the aircraft, and
by their fuel consumption characteristics. A realistic choice of CAP size and location
must be influenced by the realities of aircraft endurance, by the system expected kill
probability in each engagement, and by the necessity to provide ground turnaround
to an aircraft after it returns from a CAP mission, whether it be merely a patrol or
involve actual interception and combat.
In order to shed light on the overall CAP performance a simplified macro
model will now be described. After the various states of aircraft engaged in the CAP
operation are described important parameters that control transition between states
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are defined, and the deterministic state transition equations are presented. Numerical
solutions illustrate the system behavior.
A. STATES OF THE SYSTEM
The behavior of an interceptor aircraft during an air defense campaign
employing CAP can be described as a dynamic system. In such a system, at any point
in time, an alive interceptor is found in one of several different states. For simplicity
we will represent here only the states which, in one way or another, could have some
impact in the options open for the decision maker. Hence we consider that during
the campaign, an aircraft allocated for the CAP role can be found in one of the
following states:
(1) on the ground in the air base, ready to be launched to CAP station;
(2) flying out from the air base, going to CAP station;
(3) loitering on station;
(4) engaged in an intercept/air-to-air combat with the attacker;
(5) flying back to the air base, after terminating an intercept/air-to-air combat
with the attacker, or from CAP station if has not been engaged in any attacker
interception;
(6) on the ground in the air base, being serviced in the air base repair facility.
Once the states in which a surviving interceptor can be found at any time t are
identified, we proceed to define the state variables of the system.
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B. STATE VARIABLES DEFINITION
In general, one way by which a macro model is a helpful tool for analysis
purposes is that it is simple to design so as to keep track of the history in time of the
changes in the state variables. Therefore, in order to have a snapshot of the state of
the system at any moment, we define the state variables as a function of time as
follows
NG(t) - number of interceptors on ground alert at time t.
Noc(t) m number of interceptors in transit out to CAP station at time t.
Nc(t) a number of interceptors in CAP at time t.
Cl(t) a number of interceptors engaged from CAP station in intercept/air-to-air
combat with an attacker at time t.
C2(t) z number of interceptors engaged from their way out to CAP station in
intercept/air-to-air combat with an attacker at time t.
NB(t) a number of interceptors flying back to air base at time t.
NR(t) a number of interceptors being repaired at the air base repair shop at time t.
The variables defined above only make sense if they are framed by the defense's
interceptors inventory, otherwise they would be unbounded. So we define:
A z total number of interceptors in the defense inventory at the beginning of the
campaign.
A(t) n number of interceptors alive at time t;there can, in principle be attrition
during combat, so, unless reinforcement are possible, A(t) < A.
From the definitions above it follows that
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A(t) = NG(t) + Noc(t) + Nc(t) + Cl(t) + C2(t) + NB(t) + NR(t) (4.1)
A diagrammatic representation of the macro model for CAP management is
presented in Figure 4 below, where a block diagram shows the possible interactions
between different states of the system.
C2• ci(
Engagemen_ Engagement
,m fly out mCA
Io NcM Nc(t)
Reaoy Fly Out CAP
to fly to CAP 9ation
Figure 4. State variables interactions
The idea underlying this model is to trace dynamically the changes in the
levels of the state variables, given the initial conditions of each variable at some
initial time to. Consequently we must define the parameters that control transition
between each pair of interacting states.
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C. PARAMETERS OF THE SYSTEM
The flow of aircraft from one state to another is governed by the system's
parameters. Each of these parameters represent the rate at which aircraft leave each
state of the system. Hence the unit of measure of each the parameters is aircraft per
unit of time.
In order to simplify the representation of the interactions present in a complex
process such as the one we are modeling, we will consider the state variables as
deterministic. By suppressing the randomness, the model may not portrait all details
and constraints otherwise captured if a high-resolution type of combat simulation
were adopted. However, for air defense planning and CAP stationing analysis the
technique used here can provide useful guidance for the decision maker.
The parameters are computed based on the following assumptions regarding
the scenario modeled:
(1) the attacker is equally likely to approach the target area from any direction
within the threat sector;
(2) the attacker is flying at constant altitude and air speed, and in the target
direction;
(3) all attackers represent the same level of threat for the defense;
(4) once the defense's C3 system first detects the attacker, there is no loss of radar
contact through out the engagement;
(5) each engagement is considered as a one-on-one encounter, and in each
encounter the interceptor uses all its ammunition;
(6) the attackers feature lethal self defense capability;
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(7) the defense tries to maintain a force size on CAP equal to Z interceptors at
a time. Note that a is a decision variable, the magnitude of which affects CAP
sustainability and hence effectiveness.
The parameters' values are derived based on the time variables and fuel
variables defined in the previous chapter. All parameters are computed based on the
average value of the variables involved. So, the computation of some of those
variables must precede the state variables and MOE computations.
1. Time and Fuel Variables
For a given scenario the average values of the following variables must
be determined before the parameters can be computed:
(1) to, time length it takes to the interceptor to fly from the air base out to the
CAP station;
(2) f,, the amount of fuel used by the interceptor to fly from the air base out to
the CAP station;
(3) tb, time length it takes to the interceptor to fly from CAP station back to the
air base;
(4) ti.Because the intercept distance for an interceptor engaging an attacker
from the CAP station is different from that of an interceptor engaging from his
way out to CAP, titc have to be computed separately for each case;
(5) ft, the amount of fuel used during an interception;
(6) tt, time length it takes to an interceptor to fly from the combat disengagement
point back to the air base;
(7) fb,, fuel amount used by the interceptor to fly from the combat disengagement
point back to the air base;
(8) t.n, maximum length of time an interceptor can stay loitering on station if no
attacker arrives;
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(9) fcp maximum amount of fuel an interceptor can use for loitering on station
if no attacker arrives;
In order to compute the average values of the time variables involved, a
scenario such as the one depicted in Figure 5 is considered. In this scenario the air
base is located at point B, and the target is at point T; the CAP is stationed at point
C, at a distance d from the target; there is a radar sensor located in the target area
with an expected radar first detection range equals to R.
Before we proceed computing the (mean) values for the time variables, recall
that 0 is the angle formed by the attacker's flight path passing through the target
location (T) and the line segment connecting the target location and the air base
location (B); 0 2 0. In what follows the expression "flight parameters" stands for
combination of the aircraft gross weight, the flight altitude and the aircraft's drag
characteristics at the moment considered.
Values of a : the values of to. and foe are computed based on the
distance from air base to CAP station, and considering the long range schedule of
air speed and fuel consumption settings for the interceptor aircraft based on its
current flight parameters during this transit out phase. The value of t. in the same
fashion, but considering the current flight parameters of the interceptor aircraft











Figure 5 CAP scenario
Mean values of t• ntL •t: to compute the mean value of the intercept time
and fuel for the case when the interceptor is engaged from CAP, we proceed as
follows:
(1) Determine the value of 9 which yields the longest distance of intercept (d.)
as measured from the CAP position.
(2) The value of 0 which yields the shortest dtc will occur when 0 is equal to 0.
(3) Using equation (3.8) or (3.9),determine the values of the longest and shortest
dmt In Figure 5 these values occur when the attacker is intercepted, respectively
at points S, and S2.
(4) Determine the largest and the smallest values for t.t using S1, S2, and
according the fuel consumption setting required for an air speed determined by
the values of K and vy; the mean value of t. is the average of these values.
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(5) The mean value of f. is computed considering the schedule of fuel
consumption setting used above, and considering the mean tit
For the case in which the interceptor is engaged from his way out to CAP station, we
need to determine the mean distance from the air base to CAP station, what in
Figure 5 is represented by the point m. The computations are analogous to the
above, with the difference that the shortest dm.c will always occur when an attacker
flying along the threat sector boundary that is positioned in the same hemisphere as
the air base position is intercepted.
Mean values of t• and f•: to compute the average recovering time and
equivalent fuel amount, we have to determine those values of S which yields the
longest and the shortest recovery distances (d,). Obviously, the longest and shortest
recovering distance are measured from the air base position (point B in Figure 5) to
the closest and furthest intercept points. In Figure 5 these points are represented,
respectively, by the points S3 and S4. These values are the same either the interceptor
is engaged from CAP station or not. To compute tte use the fact that the angle
formed between the line segment connecting point B to point T and the bisector of
the threat sector is known. Then we proceed as follows:
(1) Determine the value of 0 for the shortest d, Notice that the shortest d, will
occur when an attacker flying along the threat sector boundary that is positioned
in the same hemisphere as the air base position is intercepted.
(2) The value of 0 for the longest d. depends on the displacement of the air base
with respect to the target position and the threat sector. This value will be either
0 or it will be the one determined by the interception of an attacker who is flying
along the threat sector boundary in the opposite hemisphere then the air base.
(3) Using equations (3.8) or (3.9) determine the values of S3 and S4.
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(4) Determine the smallest and the largest values for d,. The mean value for d,,
is the average of the values just found.
(5) tb and fb. are then computed using the mean value for d•, and considering
the long range schedule of air speed and fuel consumption settings for the
interceptor aircraft based on its current flight parameters during this transit back
phase.
Values of "b•• b: to compute t.b and fcb, we do steps one through
three as in the procedure to compute ti, then procedure as follows:
(1) Compute
0, ifS < h, S = min{SpS 2)
S(4.2)
tcmb S - h, if S > h, S = min{S 1, S2)
Sva
Notice that when S < h the interceptor can not engage air-to-air combat because
the attacker is within the anti-air weapons range already. In such case the
intercept is of no value for the defense.
(2) Compute fb considering the combat performance schedule of fuel
consumption setting for the interceptor aircraft.
Value of t.: to compute the value for the maximum length of time the
interceptor can stay on station if no attacker arrives, we need to address the issue of
interceptor's fuel consumption in each phase of his mission. In doing so we proceed
according to the following steps:
(1) Determine fo, the amount of fuel used by the interceptor to fly out from the
air base to CAP station. To this end one considers the long range schedule of air
speed and fuel consumption settings for the interceptor aircraft based on its flight
parameters during this transit out phase. The value of f. is affected by factors as:
the distance from the air base to CAP station
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(2) Determine the furthest point from the CAP position where a valid intercept
is possible, and determine d,, for this point. This quantity is affected by the CAP
station location within the scenario and by the selection of K, the
interceptor/attacker air speed relationship. In Figure 5 such a point is represented
by S5-
(3) Compute f., the fuel required to intercept the attacker at S5 when the
interceptor is on the CAP station at the begins the interception. ft, is influenced
by both, the CAP station position and the selection of K.
(4) Determine the d, which corresponds to this point, and compute f,, the fuel
required to fly from the intercept point back to the air base. The value of f,, is
computed considering the long range schedule of air speed and fuel consumption
settings for the interceptor aircraft based on its flight parameters during this
transit back phase.
(5) Compute fc, the maximum fuel available for loitering at the CAP station as
follows
fcA = fTo - (foc + fitc + fmb + fm +f).)- (4.3)
(6) Given fc.j, compute tm based on the maximum endurance schedule of air
speed and fuel consumption settings for the interceptor aircraft based on its
average gross weight during this loitering phase.
(7) From the previous computations we are able to compute the average value of
tb, the time it takes to the interceptor to fly from the CAP station back to the air
base. tt is computed considering the distance from CAP station to the base, and
using the long range schedule of air speed and fuel consumption settings for the
interceptor aircraft considering an average gross weight based on the fuel
remaining on board at the beginning of the transit back. This amount of fuel is
-stimated s fTcj- " t * -
2. Parameters Definition
Having defined the values of the time parameters we now define the
rate parameters of the deterministic macro model for CAP management. Each
parameter used in the model is defined as below.
X*a rate at which interceptors on ground alert take off when they are scrambled.
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.X,, represents the ground support for the mission. The value of XA is influenced by
factors such as taxi way characteristics in the air base, availability of Quick Reaction
Alert (QRA) facilities in the air base, availability of ground equipment and ground
crew to assist multiple aircraft start up, etc. XAI is computed as
1
XA = 1 aircraft per unit of time
The parameters defined next give a measure of the aircraft fuel consumption
characteristic in each phase of a CAP mission; all of them are influenced by the CAP
positioning relative to the target and air base sites as well.
XOC z rate at which interceptors finish the transit out to CAP station when they are
1
XA0 = - aircraft per unit of timetoc
Ac m rate at which interceptors finish their transit back to the air base when they fly
from CAP station to the air base due to not have being engaged in the interception
of any attacker.
1
,b, = -C aircraft per unit of time
* a rate at which interceptors finish their transit back from engagement when they
conclude a mission and fly from the point where the combat is terminated back to
the air base.
Acbm rate at which interceptors leave CAP station if they are not engaged.
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1
Xbe = - aircraft per unit of time
1.
Xb = __ aircraft per unit of timetM
The next parameter, I,, is a measure of the attacking air force capabilities.
Its value drives the whole dynamic process represented in the model, hence is a key
factor for modelling considerations and output analysis. One way to determine a
value for this parameter is by means of situation assessment or intelligence report
analysis. Its value can be taken as being constant or as being time dependent, where
t. variable.
X. a rate at which attacker aircraft enter the defense radar coverage.
1.
X, = - aircraft per unit of timeta
The next parameter, AR, represents the logistic support provided by the air
base to the CAP mission in terms of maintenance and spare parts supply. Needless
to say that these two factors may represent serious constraints to air operations of
any kind. To capture all facets of the logistic process specifically supporting the CAP
mission requires a separate study by itself. In this sense, AR is a simplified surrogate
for such process.
t.* a time length it takes for one repair crew to repair one aircraft.
cR a number of repair crews available to service interceptor aircraft in the air base's
repair shop.
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XR z rate at which aircraft leave the air base repair shop facility after being serviced.
0 aircraft per unit of time, if NR(t) = 0;
NR(t) aircraft per unit of time, if 0 < NR(t) < CR, tp >0;
XR Itmp
cR aircraft per unit of time, if NR(t) 2 CR , tp > 0.
trep
3. The Attrition Rate
The attrition rate portrays the rate at which the weapon-systems being
modeled do inflict or sustain casualties. Any model in which some kind of combat
process is represented becomes very sensitive to the way attrition is modelled. Taylor
[Ref. 10] presents a comprehensive study on this regard with a ground battle
orientation.
Two approaches are usually adopted for the numerical determination of the
attrition rate: (a) a statistical estimates based on "combat" data generated by a
detailed Monte Carlo combat simulation; or (b) an analytical submodel of the
attrition process for the particular combination of firer and target types. The first
method uses the output of a Monte Carlo simulation "...to fit one or more free
parameters in the analytical model so that it will at least duplicate and hopefully
predict results comparable to those obtainable from the simulation model." [Ref 1 l:p.
451 The conceptual idea for the second approach is to develop an analytical
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expression for each attrition-rate coefficient used in the model by considering a single
firer engaging a passive target, i.e., one that does not fire back. [Ref. 10:pp. 45-46]
According to Taylor, a general methodology for determining analytically the
attrition-rate coefficients for a wide spectrum of weapon-system types engaging
specified target types was developed by Bonder and Farrell. The idea underlying the
method is to take the attrition-rate coefficient as being the reciprocal of the expected
time for an single firer to kill a single target. Hence, if we let k represent the




Tx, is a random variable denoting the time required for an individual Y firer to
kill a single X target; and,
E[Txy] is the expected value of the random variable Txy. [Ref. 10:pp. 47-48]
To compute the expected value above, the weapon-systems were classified, according
to the lethality mechanism characteristics, as being either damage-by-impact or
damage-by-area type of weapon. Within each category, the weapon-systems were
also classified according to the firing doctrine employed, i.e., how is firing
information used to control the weapon-system's aim point and its delivery
characteristics. Based on this it was concluded that there is a large class of weapon-
systems that can be seen as a Markov-dependent-fire weapon, i.e., the outcome of
the firing of a round by the weapon-system depends only on the outcome of the
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immediately preceding round. An expression for the expected value of the time it
takes to such weapon to kill a target was developed. The reader is referred to Taylor
[Ref. 10:pp. 48-51] for more details about the methodology and the expression for
the expected value. For details on the derivation of that expression, see Hartman
[Ref. ll:pp. 129-135].
For the macro model for CAP management we will use a rather simple
attrition model based on the idea above of taking the attrition rate as the reciprocal
of the expected value of the time to kill a target. In this context the target will be an
attacker or an interceptor, depending on which attrition is being considered.
When one aircraft is firing at his opponent during an one-on-one air-to-air
combat engagement the opponent, most of the time either does not have spatial
displacement to fire back, or he is not aware of the firer aircraft presence in the
scene. In either case we have the situation in which one firer is firing at a passive
target, i.e., a target that does not fire back. This may not be true if we consider a
one-on-many or a many-on-many type of engagements but, as we are assuming in our
macro model that each engagement is an one-on-one encounter, we can consider in
this study that each firer is firing at a passive target. To compute the expected value
of the time it takes for ark interceptor in CAP to kiUP or neutralize an attacker we
reason as follow.
Let pmt• represent the expected probability that aa interceptor engaged from
CAP station successfully intercepts an attacker, where the value of pratc was obtained
from field experiments. Consider p'L., and t*'• as defined in Chapter III.
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Define P'uA as the probability that an CAP station interceptor either kills or
neutralizes the attacker given that he has fuel to remain engaged in air-to-air combat
for tomb units of time. Clearly
P'kA = P*it "P'UA
Each intercept trial can be seen as a Bernoulli trial having probability of success
equals to PY,. Under the assumption that on each encounter the interceptor uses
all his ammunition (what is a reasonable assumption depending on the aircraft
considered), we have that one interceptor is capable of performing a single
engagement, and hence each intercept trial will be accomplished by a different
interceptor. Based on this we have that each intercept attempt is an independent
Bernoulli trial.
To simplify the explanation, in what follows it is assumed that each intercept
trial is performed by a different interceptor, and that each interceptor is engaged
from CAP station and has fuel enough to remain engaged in air-to-air combat for
t'mb units of time.
Let T, T = 1, 2, 3, ..., be the number of interreption attempts needed upon
one attacker to either kill or neutralize the attacker. Clearly T is a random variable
with geometric distribution and parameter PuA. Denote I, I = 1, 2, 3, ..., as the
average number of intercept trials required to either kill or neutralize one attacker.
Then, from probability theory, I is the expected number of intercept trials to either
kill or neutralize an attacker and can be expressed as
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I = E[71 = 1L, 0<5PL.5 I land T= 1, 2,3,.. (4.4)
Consider that there are infinite many interceptors on CAP station, and assume that
when each of these interceptors operates combined with the C3 system, they both
make up a perfect weapon-system, i.e., a weapon-system for which PutA = 1. Then
only one intercept trial will be required to kill or neutralize each attacker who
arrives. Furthermore, it will take t% + tm + ttc + t'mb units of time for such perfect
weapon system to kill the first arriving attacker, and this will be the time interval
between each attacker's casualties. Obviously such a system does not exist, and
maintaining infinite aircraft on CAP station is not realistic either. Nevertheless, such
hypothetical scenario rhows that, considering the realities constraints represented by
equation (4.4), in the average, I trials are required to obtain a kill. Consequently, the
defense decision maker can use the value of I as an heuristic to decide on the
minimum force size on CAP. Let Z%, a = 1, 2, 3, ... be the required number of
interceptors to be kept on CAP per expected attacker. The value of C" is determined
as follows:
c"=I=r[-] =[ l] (4.5)
Let TA represent the average length of time between two consecutive
attackers's casualties. Then, from the discussion above, we have
and from this equation we obtain
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L = I.(t. + t. + tij. + t;lb) = t= +tm + tM int + trnb
t, + tM +ti + tt+
TL flt + • +tm t 0 <p* <1 and 0 <pL <1 (4.6)
Pntce PkIA
If we consider that p'uA and p'mtc are surrogates for the efficiency of the
defense's CI system and interceptor synergism, equation (4.6) makes sense. It says
that the more efficient the weapons-system, the shorter the average time to inflict a
casualty. So, any degradation on the values of p'k and p'it, implies on a reduction
of the CAP efficiency in terms of attackers killed per unit of time. Hence, before we
can compute the attrition rate for the macro model in a given scenario, any
degradation on the values of p'k and p'mtc due to scenario realities must be
identified and accounted for in the model.
One wayp'itc can be degraded is due to Electronic Counter Measures (ECM)
from the part of the attackers. If the attackers do use ECM, the CAP performance
is affected no matter what the CAP station position is. So this type of degradation
will not be treated in this study. Regardingp'kA, it is clear from equation (3.15) and
from the rationale that precedes it, that the actual range from the target area an
attacker is intercepted does affect the interceptor's chances of success during the air-
to-air combat that follows the interception.
Define TuA as the average length of time between two consecutive attackers's
casualties in a given scenario. Letp uArepresent the success probability in air-to-air
63
combat engagement the interceptor has in a given scenario; let pm. represent the
probability that an interceptor engaged from CAP station in a given scenario
successfully intercepts an attacker. Considering the purposes of the present study, we
will letpi.t, = p mtj. To correct the value of PkA for the scenario realities, the value
of tomb is determined using equation (4.2), and the value of puA is computed as
follows
p 9, if t.1,b 2 tnb
PUA PL.•.,L ff 0 < tmb < tmb (4.7)
0, if tcmb = 0
Equation (4.7) degrades substantially the interceptor's chances of success in an air-to-
air engagement if at the end of the interception the time available for combat is
below the value that grants the expected conditions for mission accomplishment.
Consistent with the argument in Chapter EIl, Section , Subsection , the fourth
power in this equation says that, regarding the chances of success in the air-to-air
combat, to use the fuel for combat to any other phase of the mission will degrade the
CAP interceptor's mission performance. In Figure 6 we have a plot of the probability
of kill in air-to-air combat as a function of the time available for combat. This Figure
is based on equation (4.7), when considering a typical tactical scenario with a radar
first detection range of 75 nautical miles measured from the target position; an anti-
air weapons effective range of 10 nautical miles around the target area; the value for
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PROBABILITY of KILL vs. TIME for COMBAT
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Figure 6. Probability of Kill as a function of the time available for combat
p'•, is 0.75, with a t'Cb of 5 minutes. Considering an attacker flying at an air speed
equals to Mach 0.7 equation (3.15) gives a value of S, equals to 45 nautical miles.
Once the scenario effects has been captured, the expected time between two
consecutive attackers casualties can be computed. Let Tu represent this quantity.
The expression for this expected value is obtained rewriting equation (4.6) as
following
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t a + t M + ti t, + tmb if 0 < pmt, < 1 and 0 < pk, < (4.8)
TUA =Pintc PUA(4
0, if puA = 0 or pint, = 0
where ptA is computed using equation (4.7) above, tcmb is computed using equation
(4.2), and the value of pintc is equal to p it . Notice that when either pkA or pmtc is
is equal to 0, then no casualty is inflicted to the attackers, meaning that the air-to-air
combat engagement is not possible in the given scenario.
Notice in equation (4.8) that the expected time between casualties is a
function of t., If the possibility of a transient interceptor4 to engage an interception
is considered, then there will exist two different values for t, in the scenario,
yielding distinct values for TuA. So, there must exist two distinct variables in the
model to account for this situation. Hence, let TlkL• be the expected time between
two consecutive casualties inflicted to the attackers by the interceptions starting from
CAP station; and T2kA be the expected time between two consecutive casualties
inflicted to the attackers by transient interceptors. Additionally, define tlt,c as being
the time elapsed from the moment an interception beginning from CAP station starts
until the moment the interceptor engages air-to-air combat with the attacker; and
t2intc as being the analogous variable for the case in which the interception is
performed by transient interceptor. Then
4 Here a "transient interceptor" means the interceptor who is flying out from the air base
to CAP station and has not arrived on station yet.
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ta + tm + tlitc +tnb if <p, <1 and 0<p < (.
TI CM = ArAme" PUA , f9w<Iad ~k 49
0, ifpkA =0 orP p.=0
and
ta + tn + t 2intc + trb if 0<"Prat< 1 and O<puA< 1
T2UA = (P4. PUA10)
0, ifpk =0 orPmt =0
The next issue to address is the way the interceptors are attritioned by the
attackers. Due to the assumption that the attackers exhibit lethal self defense
capability, define pkm as the probability that an attacker kills an interceptor during
the air-to-air combat engagement. The value of pkm is determined based on the
decision maker judgement, considering the attacker aircraft characteristics,
Intelligence reports analysis, interceptor air-crew training level, etc. Let Tlkm be the
expected time between two consecutive interceptors casualties when the attacker is
engaged from CAP station; and Ti1m be the analogous variable for the case in which
the attacker is engaged by a transient in,.erceptor. The expression for these expected
values are
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ta + tD + tlflntc +tcmb if TtA>O (.1T l kW = .P atce " P k A I ' ( 4 .1 1 ) >
0, otherwise
and
rta + tID+ t2a. + tcmb if 2-A > 0
T2kM = P "P ' i >0(4.12)
0, otherwise
The argument for these expressions is the same as for T1wA and T2uA, because the
number of intercept trial needed to kill one interceptor is also a random variable
having a geometric distribution with parameter pt -pL,. Notice that these expected
values are conditional to the analogous interceptors' variables. This is so due to the
fact that the attackers are not seeking to engage with the interceptors, so it is only
possible for them to inflict any casualty to the interceptors if the interceptors do
engage the attackers.
With the value for the expected times between casualties determined, we can
define the attrition rate coefficients for the macro model for CAP management.
Let plA be the rate at which an individual interceptor from CAP station kills
or neutralizes one arriving attacker; and U2MA be the rate at which an individual
transient interceptor kills or neutralizes one arriving attacker. Let tlAj be the rate
at which an arriving attacker kills or neutralizes an interceptor from CAP station;
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and p2A, be the rate at which an arriving attacker kills or neutralizes a transient
interceptor. The units for these variables are as follows
attackers killed
ira i(interceptors). (time)' = 1, 2
P interceptors killed
#J,,a is (attackers). (time)' j = 1, 2




,if 2 k > 0 (4.13b)
0, otherwise
I1 , if Tlk > 0




S1 ,if r2kM >O0
#2AI 772k(4.14b)
0, otherwise
and these are expressions to represent the attrition rates in the macro model for
CAP management.
D. INDICATOR VARIABLES
The parameters studied on the previous section govern the rate at which
aircraft leave each state of the system. However, in order for the system's behavior
to make any physical sense, a flow between two states can occur at time t if and only
if some specific condition holds at the state variable level at time t. Hence, to
preserve the physical meaning of the system's behavior, a set of binary variables is
used to detect pre-specified conditions whenever the flow between two interacting
states takes place. Based on the pre-specified conditions, the binary variables turn on
or off the flow between two interacting states. These binary variables are the
indicator variables of the system, and are defined below.
1, if NG(t) > 0IGIM =_
0, otherwise




1"J, if Nc(t) > 0
J, otherwise
E. MODEL STRUCTURE
The definitions of system parameters, attrition rate coefficients and indicator
variables carried out in the previous sections lay the grounds for the structure of the
macro model for CAP management.
The state variables defined earlier in this chapter represent each of the
aspects identified as germane for analysis purposes in an air defense scenario in
which the interceptors are used in CAP. We have seen in the previous sections how
the system parameters and the attrition rate coefficients represent the rate at which
the interceptor aircraft represented in the model flow from one state to another
within the system as time passes. The way this flow is regulated by the indicator
variables were also addressed. These parameters and variables will now be used as
building blocks of a system of the deterministic state transition equations that
represents the scenario's interactions.
The changes with time in an air defense scenario using interceptors in CAP
station can be represented by a set of Ordinary Differential Equations (ODE),
provided the initial conditions at some time to are known. Considering that such
initial conditions are the basic set of information upon which the air defense planning
work is made, a macro model for such a scenario can be modeled deterministicaly
by the following system of differential equations:
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dA(t) 11A 1 Cl(t) i , - C202(t) (4.15a)
dt
dNG(t) =R - IXAIOV NC(t)].IGND (4.15b)
dt
dN0 c(t)
dt -NC(t)]" 'OND - A oc NO(t) X, A(I - ICPlc(4.15c)
d~t) = X o 0Noc(t) - X c. Nc(t) - X, - cAp (4.15d)
dt
dCl()=a-( -I~ o C2(-) - (- 1 2, (4.15f)
dt aCP C()(1
dc2(t) = XIA(1- Clh~t)* 1 + -t2 C2(t).(2 + + ct Bt';b X. (4.14g)
dNR___ = p1B.C1(t) + -X~C2t W) R~ ,N()-NBt.~ (4.15h)
dt











NK(O) = k; and
A(O) = NG(O) + Noc(O) + Nc(O) + C1(O) + C2(0) + NB(O).
The argument from which the system of equations (4.15) is derived is as
follows.
Equation (4.15a) represent the rate of change of A(t) with time. Notice that
A(t) only decreases with time what makes intuitive sense because defense
reinforcement is not being considered in the model. A(t) decreases at a rate
equivalent to the attackers attrition rate coefficients for each engagement; and this
decrease is proportional to the number of interceptors engaged in each type of
engagement.
Equation (4.15b) represents the rate of change of No(t) with time. The first
term on the right hand side represents the expected increase in NG(t) due to aircraft
leaving the repair shop. The second term in the right hand side of (4.15b) represents
the decrease in No with time. The factor X,. [e - Nc(t)] is the demand for
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interceptor on CAP station whenever the number of aircraft on station falls below
the nominal force size to be kept on station; when such a demand occurs, it is
attended by the air base at a rate 1,.But this will happen if there is some interceptor
available on the ground at time t, what is controlled by the indicator variable IGNiT.
Equation (4.15c) represents the rate of change of Noc(t) with time. The first
term on the right hand side of this equation is the expected increase in Noc(t) caused
by the interceptors who leave the air base going to CAP. Notice that this term is the
same as the second term on the right hand side of equation (4.15b), what agrees with
the intuition. The term XOC. Noc(t) represents the decrease in the level of Noc caused
by those transient interceptors finishing the transit at a rate XOc. The third term, X.a" (1
- IC")" Ioo represents the decrease in Noc caused by those transient interceptors
engaged in intercept during their way out to CAP. Note that this happens only when
an attacker arrives in a moment in which the CAP station is empty, as indicated by
the value of IcAp; also, interceptors can be engaged from their way out to CAP if
there exist at least one transient interceptor at time t, what is controlled by the value
of Ioc.
Equation (4.i5d) represents the rate of change of Nc(t) "-.,h time. The first
term on its right hand side is the increase on the level of Nc(t) caused by those
transient interceptors who finishes their transit to CAP station, and is the same as
the second term on the right hand side of equation (4.15c). The term ),d,.Nc(t)
represents the decrease in Nc(t) caused by those interceptors who leave CAP station
without engaging interception because no attacker arrives; this decrease occurs at a
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rate Xb and is proportional to the number of interceptors on station at time t. The
term Xa. Ic.p is the decrease in Nc(t) caused by those interceptors who leaves the
CAP to engage an arriving attacker; this decrease occur at a rate X,,, provided there
is some interceptor on station, what is indicated by Ic.
Equation (4.15e) represents the rate of change in the level of Cl(t) with time.
Its right hand side shows that Cl(t) is increased by those interceptors who have left
CAP station to engage an arriving attacker, what happens at a rate X., given that
there is at least one interceptor on station. See that the first term of this right hand
side is derived from the third term of the right hand side of equation (4.15d). The
second term on the right hand side of equation (4.15e) is the expected decrease on
the level of Cl(t) with time. Such decrease is proportional to the number of aircraft
engaged in the fight, and is caused by the mutual attrition that occurs in the air-to-air
combat engagement, what occurs at a rate (W1I + AlU).
Equation (4.150 represent the rate of change of C2(t) with time. The first
term on its right hand side represents the expected increase in the level of C2(t) and
is the same as the last term on the right hand side of equation (4.15c). The rationale
for the second term on this equation right hand side is analogous to that for the
second term on the right hand side of equation (4.15e).
Equation (4.15g) represents the rate of change of NB(t) with time. NB(t) is fed
by three distinct states as can be seen in Figure 4. The three first terms on the right
hand side of this equation is the expected increase in the number of interceptors in
the transit back to the air base with time. Observe that the first term represents those
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air combat winner interceptors generated by the second term of equations (4.15e),
and the second term represent those winner generated by the second term of
equation (4.15f); to these returning interceptors it is added those who did not engage
the fight and are flying back to the air base from the CAP station, what is
represented by the expression Ac," Nc(t) in the third term; this expression is the same
as in the second term of equation (4.15d). The expected decrease in the number of
interceptors flying back to the air base with time is represented by the last term in
this equation; such decrease is proportional to the number of returning interceptors
at time t, and happens at a rate equals to (Xt, + Xt).
Equation (4.15h) represents the rate of change of NR(t) with time. Its right
hand side shows that NR(t) is increased by the same amount by which NB(t) is
decreased, as can be verified by the fact that the first term on this equation's right
hand side is the same as the last term on the right hand side of equation (4.15f). The
expected decrease in the level of NR(t) is equivalent to the increase in the level of
N,(t) because the second term in this equation's right hand side is the same as the
first term on the right hand side of equation (4.15b).
Equation (4.15i) represent the rate of change of Nk(t) with time. On the
contrary of A(t), Nk(t) only increases with time what also makes intuitive sense.
Observing Figure 4 one will note that Nk(t) is not represented there; it also can be
seen that Nk(t) plays no functional role in the system of equations. The reason this
quantity is accounted for in the system is because it will be used in the Measures of
Effectiveness (MOE) in the numerical examples presented in next Chapter.
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V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
The macro model for CAP management described in the previous Chapter
will be used as a too! to analyze the option of CAP stationing which renders the best
results for overall the air defense mission.
Two distinct scenarios were used in the three numerical examples shown
below. Both scenarios represent typical tactical environments where the defense faces
EW limitations. In one of the scenarios solutions were obtained for two different
intercept tactics: interceptors using subsonic air speed during the interception
procedure, and interceptors using supersonic air speed during the interception
procedure.
A. THE SCENARIO AND INITIAL CONDITIONS
The following conditions are common to both scenarios:
(1) The attackers are equally likely to approach the target area within a sectors
of 120 degrees. This sector is referred to as threat sector.
(2) The angle formed between the bisector of the threat sector and the line
segment connecting the air base location to the target location measures 135
degrees; the air base is at 43 nautical miles from the target position.
(3) The interceptor aircraft is considered as being an F-5E type of aircraft which
takes off from the air base armed with two side-winder infra-red air-to-air missiles
and 560 rounds of 20 mm cannon air-to-air ammunition; and is equipped with an
external 275 US gal expendable fuel tank.
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(4) The hypothetical attacker aircraft is flying at 20000 feet, at an air speed
equivalent to Mach Number 0.7, and features a limited air-to-air lethal self--
defense capability, with flight characteristics yielding a sustained turn rate of 5.0
degrees per second when the encounter conditions are considered'
(5) The attacking air force is capable of maintaining a constant effort of one raid
at each 15 minutes interval for a 12 hours period.
(6) It is considered that, in the average, it takes ten sustained turns to the
interceptor air crew to obtain firing position during an air-to-air combat
engagement, when using the interceptor aircraft and engaging against an aircraft
similar to one used by the attacker air force.
(7) The probability of success in each intercept trial is considered to be 0.97.
(8) It is considered that in each air-to-air combat engagement the interceptor
aircraft has a probability of killing the attacker equal to 0.75, and the probability
that the interceptor is killed by the attacker is 0.1.
(9) The initial number of interceptor aircraft available in the defense air force
inventory is 20.
(10) The identification time of the C3 system, tm, is one minute, counted from the
moment the attacker is first detected by the early warning radar system (EWR).
(11) The scramble time in the air base, tM, is two minutes.
(12) All interceptor aircraft have to undergo maintenance service between two
consecutive sorties.
(13) There are ten repair crew in the air base maintenance shop. This number is
kept constant during the air campaign considered.
(14) The time it takes to one repair crew to service one interceptor aircraft in the
maintenance shop, ti,,, is 30 minutes.
In one scenario, which we will call scenario 1, the early warning average
distance is considered to be 60 nautical miles, and the anti-air weapons effective
I For actual planning these value is obtainable from the attacker aircraft Flight Manual
analysis.
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range is ten nautical miles. In the other scenario, called scenario 2, it is considered
an average early warning range of 150 nautical miles, the same anti-air weapons
capabilities as in scenario 1, but the attackers are assumed to be using stand-off
weapons with a release range of 40 nautical miles from the target area. Hence, in
scenario 1 the attackers have to be destroyed/neutralized by the interceptors at or
before they reach a 10 nautical miles range from the target area, whereas in scenario
2 this have to be accomplished at 40 nautical miles from the target area.
B. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOE)
To assess the performance of the interceptors in CAP as a defensive weapon
system the following quantities were used:
(1) MOEI: Number of attackers casualties due to CAP interceptors - this quantity
gives a measure of the lethality of the CAP interceptors. It can be used in furthers
analysis (not carried out in this study) to assess the contribution of the CAP to the
overall effectiveness of the integrated air defense system (LADS). This quantity
should be maximized.
(2) MOE2: Number of CAP interceptors casualties due to engagements with the
attackers - this quantity measures the capability of the CAP interceptors in
interacting with the attackers lethality. It can be used in further analysis to assess
how the CAP option impacts the interceptors survivability. This quantity should
be minimized.
(3) MOE3: Kill ratio - this quantity measures the ratio between the attackers
casualties and the CAP interceptors casualties. It gives a measure, from the
attacking air force perspective, of the cost in attacker aircraft the intruders have
to pay due to the CAP interceptors. This quantity should be maximized.
(4) MOE4: Number of attackers surviving the CAP interceptors - this quantity
gives a measure of the "leakage" of attackers aircraft that will have to be engaged
by the anti-air weapons system. Because the capabilities of the anti-air weapons
system are usually measured by the number of targets that can be engaged at a
time, MOE4 will be expressed as the rate at which the attackers reach the anti-air
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weapons effective range line, i.e., attackers per minute. This quantity should be
minimized.
C. PARAMETERS COMPUTATIONS
To assess the CAP performance in scenario 1, the CAP was stationed at 10,
30 and 40 nautical miles from the target area. In scenario 2 it was considered the
CAP stationed at 40, 60, 80, 100, 120, and 140 nautical miles from the target area.
As it was seen in Chapter IV, the numerical values of many of the parameters
depends on the CAP distance from the target area because they are functions of the
time variables involved, and to evaluate these time variables the flight characteristics
of the interceptor aircraft have to be considered. Because the interceptor aircraft is
assumed to be an F-5E type of aircraft, the computations below are based on data
found in the NORTHROP F-5E Flight Manual [Ref. 12]. In what follows all
distances are measured in nautical miles (N.M.); the fuel quantities are measured in
pounds of fuel (lb); the time is measured in minutes unless otherwise stated; the
altitude is expressed in feet (ft); and the air speed is measured either in Mach
Number (M), or in nautical miles per minute (N.M./min).
Force Size on CAP (Z): using the probabilities considered above and equation
(4.5) the value of Z for both scenarios is obtained as follows-
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CAP altitude selection: considering the attacker aircraft characteristics and the
interceptor take off configuration given above, the CAP altitude selection should give
the interceptor an altitude advantage over the expected threat because the
interceptor's short-range weapons characteristics. Furthermore, it should be such that
the interceptor's endurance during the loiter phase is improved. According to the
aircraft's Flight Manual the loitering altitude for maximum endurance fuel
consumption setting varies with the initial aircraft gross weight [Ref. 12:p. A5-3]. The
initial altitude recommended is 27000 ft, but to improve the interceptors chances to
acquire the attacker by visual means, the CAP altitude adopted will be 25000 ft.
Time and fuel to fly out to CAP station (tj)and (f:,: using data from the
performance charts in the aircraft's Flight Manual the following expressions were
derived for these quantities as a function of the CAP station distance from the air
base [Ref. 12:pp. A4-17, A4-18]:
6.5 min, if DBC : 53 N.M.
O(0.125. DBC - 0.125)rain, if DBC > 53N.M.
I 670 lb, if DBC s 53 N.M.
f=(6.25 DBC - 339) lb, if DBC > 53 N.M.
where DBC is the distance from air base to CAP station.
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Maximum time the interceptor can stay engaged in air-to-air combat (t'.)
and the fuel for combat (f.-): using performance data from the Flight Manual the
following expressions were derived for fcb and tcb, respectively [Ref 13:p. A8-11]:
f =b  (200. tmb) lb, and tb = (0.005. f mb) min
To compute t'•mb we use the fact that, under the conditions listed above, the
interceptor aircraft will have a sustained turn rate in the order of 7.5 degrees per
second [Ref. 12:pp. A8-46, A8-48]. In the present examples it is assumed that the
attacker's turn characteristic is known. If this is not the case, one can derive the
attacker's turning performances, provided some specific data about the attacker
aircraft is available, by using the Energy-State Approximation theory as found in
Nicolai [Ref. 6:pp. 3-21-3 - 3-28]. Knowing the turn rate of the two aircraft, we see
that the interceptor has a turn rate margin advantage of 2.5 degrees per second.
Hence, using the same rationale as described in Chapter III, Section D, Subsection
1, we divide 180 by this margin advantage and find that the minimum time an air-to-
air combat engagement between these two aircraft can theoretically last is 72
seconds. In the scenario's conditions it is given that, in the average, it takes ten
sustained turns to the interceptor's air crew to obtain firing position in air-to-air
combat engagement when engaging a similar aircraft, so this information is used
here. A 180 degrees sustained turn with the interceptor aircraft takes (180 degrees
+ 7.5 degrees per second) = 24 seconds, implying that ten of such turns will last 240
seconds; summing these two quantities and considering one sustained turn more for
disengagement we get 336 seconds of combat duration. Form these figures it seems
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reasonable to consider a teb equals to 5.5 mi, and once we having the value of tcb,
to obtain the value of Jrc is straightforward. These values of t*cmb and f*, are the
ones that give the interceptor a pf obability of kill equal to 0.75.
The selection of the interceptor/attacker airspeed relationship (K): usually the
value of K is selected such that the interceptor air speed, in addition of making the
intercept geometrically feasible, also gives the interceptor the conditions to engage
the air-to-air combat at the best of its maneuverability characteristics yet preserving
fuel. For the sake of example we are considering in one of the scenarios the use of
supersonic intercept air speed. For the interceptor aircraft being used in the present
examples the most favorable subsonic air speed for interception is Mach Number
0.92, what gives a value of K equals to 1.31. For the supersonic scenario it will be
considered an air speed equivalent to Mach Number 1.2, giving a K equals to 1.71.
The mean time to intercept j aind the fuel for interception (f-.tJ: to
compute these quantities, it must be considered that the attackers are equally likely
to approach the target area from any direction within the threat sector. So it is
"reasonable to assume that the CAP will be stationed along the threat sector bisector
line. To compute the average values of ttc and n to be used in the macro model
for CAP management, one must first to determine the average value of di.t, the
distance covered by the interceptor during the intercept procedure. As seen in
Chapter IV, Section C, Subsection 1, the values of 9 which dmtc is maximum and
minimum in a given scenario is easily determined. For each of these values of 0, the
quantity S, i.e., the intercept range as measured from the target position, is computed
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using equation (3.8), because in both scenarios we have K # 1. Having the largest and
the smallest possible values of S in the scenario, equation (3.6) gives the
corresponding values of P, the attacker's range at the beginning of the intercept, as
measured from the target position. And once the values of P are known, the
respective values of d.t are determined using the fact that, according to Figure 2,
d.tc = K. (P - S). The average value of dtc in each scenario is the mean value of
largest and the smallest di.,c found in this process. The above computations to find
the average value of dtc have to be carried out for each scenario, for each different
value of K, and for each CAP station position selected. Considering the two values
of K used in these numerical examples, the following expressions for ftc and ttc as
functions of d.t were derived from the interceptor's Flight Manual:
when K = 1.31 [Ref. 12:pp. A8-11, A8-18],
(20.45.dt) lb, if d,• 22 N.M.
(10.45. dintc - 220) lb, if dintc > 22 N.M.
=I {( (0.114. ditc) min, if dintc-< 22 N.M.
(0.109. ditc + 2.5) mrin, if dintc > 22 N.M.
when K = 1.71 [Ref. 12:pp. A8-11, A8-14],
84
(20. ditc) lb, if dt• 25 N.M.
intc {(125 d = 730) lb, if dt > 25 N.M.
=I (0.1" dnt) Min, if ditg 25 N.M.
tintc {(0.0833 dmtc + 0.416) min, if dmtc > 25 N.M.
The mean values of the recovery time (tb.) and the fuel to recovery_ (fj: to
compute these two quantities the mean recovery distance, d, have to be determined
first. The largest and the smallest values possible of d, are determined for each
scenario and for each value of K using the same procedure as described in Chapter
IV, Section C, Subsection 1. With the mean value of dc determined, the values for
tt and for fb, are computed using the following expressions derived from the Flight
Manual performance charts [Ref. 12:p. A4-25]:
t, = d ramin and fý.--(6.1. dm + 53.44) lb
The maximum time on station (t)'with the mean values of fuel consumption
for each phase of the CAP interceptor mission in each scenario computed above, it
is possible to compute the maximum time an interceptor can stay loitering on station
if no attacker arrives, t.. To this end, equation (4.3) is used to determine fcAp, the
amount of fuel apportioned for loitering on station. Having this quantity, the
following expression is used to compute the value of tm in the given scenarios, for the
CAP altitude considered [Ref. 12:p. A5-3]:
t, = (0.023 .fcA - 4.23) min
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Once the mean values of the time variables for the scenarios are computed,
the parameter computations are straightforward following the parameter definitions
given in Chapter IV, Section C, Subsection 2. For each CAP distance selected, the
actual value of tmb is computed considering the minimum value of the intercept
range S found previously. If the intercept range in less then the quantity h + t*.b-V,
the value of tcmb is calculated according to equation (4.2). This actual value of tcnb
is used then to adjust the probability of kill according to equation (4.7), and the
attrition rates are finally calculated as prescribed by equations (4.13) and equations
(4.14).
For each of the three different situations given by the two scenarios above the
initial values used for each state variable of the macro model for CAP management
was as following:
A(0) = 20, meaning that the initial defense inventory is 20 interceptors, and no
interceptor was lost at time 0;
NG(O) = 14, meaning that the defense starts with 14 interceptors ready to fly in the
air base;
Noc(O) = 0, meaning that there is no transient interceptor at time 0;
Nc(0) = 2, meaning that the defense starts with Z interceptors on station;
C1(0) = 0, meaning that there is no CAP interceptor engaged at time 0;
C2(0) = 0, meaning that there is no transient interceptor engaged at time 0;
NB(0) = 0, meaning that there is no interceptor flying back to the air base at time
0;
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NR(O) - 4, meaning that the defense starts with 20% of its inventory under repair;
N•(O) - 0, meaning that no attacker was killed at time 0.
D. NUMERICAL SOLUTIONS
A computer program using FORTRAN 77 was developed to compute the
parameters according to the procedures described above. It worth emphasizing that
such a program checks for intercept feasibility at each time variable or fuel variable
computation, considering the CAP stationing being used.
The system of equations (4.15) was solved by means of the software package
MATLAB which uses the automatic step size Runge-Kutta-Fehlberg integration
method [Ref. 13:p. 3-139]. Considering the MOE's adopted, it was assumed that the
attacker air force has unlimited supply of airplanes. With this assumption, each
scenario condition was ran simulating a 12 hours period with a constant arriving rate,
in order to be possible to detect any trend in the results. A time history plot of the
results of each scenario is shown and analyzed in the next Section.
E. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The results of the model runs are presented in the plots below. The plots are
grouped by MOE, and each plot contains the results of all CAP stationing options
for the scenario considered.
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1. Scenario 1
In Figures 7, 8, 9, and 10 below we have the results for each MOE
regarding the CAP stationing options in scenario 1. As far as MOE1 is concerned,
the inspection of Figure 7 shows that option for stationing the CAP at 10 N.M. range
from the target area is the least recommended. It is clear that stationing the CAP
further away from the target will cause more damage to the attackers. Placing the
CAP either at 30 N.M. or 50 N.M. has equivalent performances in the beginning of
the battle, up to around the third hour of battle; from this point in time on, the
performance of the CAP at 50 N.M. range dominates markedly.
Besides the fact that it gives a clear idea of the damage caused to the
attackers, MOE1 does not show how much these results cost to the defense. One way
of obtaining this type of assessment is by means of MOE2 in Figure 8 below. This
Figure shows an equivalent performance of the three options in the very beginning
of the period, with some noticeable difference appearing again around the third hour
of battle. Considering the fact that the quantity of MOE2 should be minimized, the
inspection of Figure 8 shows that the best option in this regard is to place the CAP
at 30 N.M. from the target area.
However, if we observe the magnitude of the values on the y-axis scale, it can
be seen that the difference has any physical meaning only by the end of the 12 hour
period.
The analysis of MOE3 in Figure 9 gives a better mean of comparison among
the relative performance of each option. It shows how the CAP stationing can affect
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Figure 8. Scenario 1, MOE2: Interceptors Casualties
MOE4 is shown in Figure 10 below. It gives a measure of how much the CAP
inte ceptors alleviate the anti-air weapons system's work load. The option for the
CAP at 30 N.M. is again the one which yields the best results considering that such
an effective measure should be minimized.
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Figure 9. Scenario 1, MOE3: Kill Ratio
2. Scenario 2
The subsonic intercept in scenario 2 is shown in Figure 11. It is observed that
in the first hour of activities all options perform fairly alike. From this point in time
on, a definite distinction among the options is noticed.
The 140 N.M. option dominates the performance ranking through out the time
period analyzed, reaching the total of 42 attackers killed. It is also observed that the
other options present the same general behavior as that of the best option, the least
effective of them all getting at the end of the period with around 30 enemies killed.
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Figure 10. Scenario 1 MOE4: CAP Leakage
When Figure 12 is analyzed a different result is observed. Options for
stationing the CAP either at 80 N.M. or at 100 N.M. presents a general dominance
through out the period, reaching the score of about 40 kills. Nevertheless, the most
significant aspect in this Figure is the behavior of the two most distant CAP options.
Notice that their killing scores remain well below those of other options. In Figure
13 there is a subplot of Figure 12 focusing on the initial phase of the period. It can
be seen that during this phase the CAP interceptors attrites the attackers at a very
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Figure 11. Scenario 2 (subsonic), MOE1: Attackers Casualties
'slow pace if compared with the other options. Notice also that during the initial
phase of activities the 100 N.M. is not dominant.
In Figure 14 we have the results for MOE2 from the subsonic intercept case
in scenario 2. Considering that the quantity regrading this MOE should be
minimizd, the options perform in the inverse order as they did for MOEL1 Notice
that after a 12 hours battle the largest difference between options is of barely one
aircraft. See that with subsonic intercept there will have fuel enough for the
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Figure 12. Scenario 2 (supersonic), MOEI: Attackers Casualties
interceptor to engage the air-to-air combat in all CAP stationing options because in
this case there is no correction in the expected probability of kill. Hence, all options
yield similar performances.
The plot of the results regarding MOE2 for the supersonic case in scenario
2 is shown in Figure 15, and in Figure 16 there is a subplot of Figure 15.
94
ATTACKERS CASUALTIES vs CAP DISTANCE
CScenario 2 - Supersonic Intercept)
I I I
o. ....................... i ............ • .... ...... ...... ........ 4.......... ..... . ..... ................................
f
0.75 ... ...... . ......-...... . ....... .
601NM.
40:M.M






Figure 13. Subplot from Figure 12
The same behavior is observed as for MOE1. Now the least damage to the
interceptors occurs when the CAP is stationed further away from the target.
Comparing this plot with the one in Figure 12, it is seen that the two further CAP
options are attrited at a pace analogous at that at which they impose to the attackers.
One explanation for this fact is found in the fuel consumption analysis presented in
Chapter HI, Section D, Subsection 2. In the present case it applies as follows.
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Figure 14. Scenario 2 (subsonic), MOE2: Interceptors Casualties
To station the CAP at longer distance from the target area in such a scenario
implies that it will be placed it at longer distance from the air base also. This
presupposes a greater amount of fuel being apportioned for the transit out phase of
the mission. On the other hand, a further away CAP also signifies that the intercept
will occur at further distances from the air base, hence increasing the fuel needed for
recovery. In addition to these fuel demand increases, the high air speed setting during
the interception will demand another great amount of fuel being allotted to the
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intercept phase. Because the fuel for combat shall not be used in any phase of the
mission other than the combat engagement itselfL all the fuel demand excess is
supplied by the fuel for the loitering phase on CAP. In some situations this causes
the fuel for loitering to be consumed by the fuel excess demand generated by the
scenario specificities, depleting it to the zero level; and when this happens there will
be no interceptor on station. At the model level this fact is represented by the
conditions 1w = 0, and Nc(t) < a. When the model detects these conditions
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Figure 16 Subplot from Figure 15
another interceptor is launched from the air base to go to CAP station, but this
interceptor will not loiter on station either, so there will he a constant flow of
transient interceptors from air base to CAP station back and forth. Under these
conditions all the engagements that take place are those involving the transient
/
interceptors which, due to the geometry of the problem, yield a lower pace attrition
rate than that for the engagement from CAP station. Hence, according to Figures 12
and 15, stationing the CAP at further distances and using supersonic air speed setting
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for the intercept will render fewer casualties on both sides of the battle. This explains
the lower kill rates in Figures 12 and 15 for the far out CAP options.
In Figure 17 below we have the results regarding MOE3 for scenario 2 with
subsonic intercept.
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Figure 17. Scenario 2 (subsonic) MOE3: Kill Ratio
Considering the nature of MOE3, the option with best performance is to place
the CAP either at the 60 N.M. or at 100 N.M. ranges. But if we observe the
magnitude of the values on the y-axis scale, it is clear that, as far as a decision is
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concerned, the differences in performance among the options has no physical
meaning.
Figure 18 shows the results for MOE3 for the supersonic intercept in scenario
2. Figure 19 magnifies Figure 18.
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Figure 18. Scenario 2 (supersonic), MOE3: Kill Ratio
It can be noticed that, besides the numerical differences shown in Figure 19,
in this scenario also the air defense planner can not decide among the options based
only on this MOE. target area longer then 80 N.M., during the initial phase of the
battle the attackers can pass through the area of CAP responsibility at no charge.
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Regarding the other options, it is seen that besides the differences shown in MOE1
and in MOE2, the net benefits of each of these options are equivalent.
Figure 19 shows the results for MOE4 from scenario 2 with the subsonic
intercept.
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Figure 19. Scenario 2 (subsonic), MOE4: CAP Leakage
The results regarding MOE4 look similar for all options, according to Figure
19 . There is a significant drop in the leakage level in the initial phase of the CAP
activity and a leveling out from the beginning of the third hour of battle. To make
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it possible to distinguish among the options we will magnify that portion of Figure
19 where the initial decrease occurs. In Figure 20 we have a subplot of Figure 19
containing such a zooming.
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Figure 20. Subplot from Figure 19
The analysis of Figure 20 shows that besides the similarities, with the option
for stationing the CAP at 40 N.M., between the third and the forth hour of battle on,
the attackers will be surviving the CAP interceptors at a rate of 0.008994 aircraft per
minute, what is equivalent to one attacker being engaged by the ani-air weapons
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system each 111 minutes. If the CAP is stationed at 140 instead, the leakage rate by
the same time will be around 0.008062 attackers per minute, i.e., one attacker being
engaged by the anti-air weapons system each 124 minutes. By the seventh our of
battle, disregarding the option adopted, the leakage rate level out at a rate around
0.00781, meaning one attacker each 128 minutes. If we consider that the attackers
are arriving at a constant rate of one attacker each 15 minutes, we can see that, in
this scenario the CAP interceptors represent a great relief for the ground-based
weapons.
MOE4 for the same scenario with supersonic intercept is presented in Figure
21 below. In this case the options for the further CAP stationing show the worst
performances. Observe that in the initial phase of the battle, with the CAP placed
at the further ranges, the leakage rate almost the same as the attackers' arrival rate,
what is consistent with the previous analysis. In Figure 22 we have the zooming of
of the plot in Figure 21 focusing on the closer CAP options. If the CAP is stationed
at 100 N.M., by the one hundredth minute of battle the leakage rate will be around
"0.01271 aircraft per minute, meaning one ground weapons engagement at each 78
minutes. If the CAP is at 40 N.M., by this time this leakage rate will be around
0.01375 aircraft per minute, meaning one ground weapon engagement at each 72
minutes; with this option the leakage rate stabilizes by the fourth hour of battle at
value 0.00794, yielding an engagement rate for the anti-air weapons of one aircraft
each 126 minutes.
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Figure 22. Subplot of Figure 19 for the short range CAP.
Suppose that in scenario 1 the defense is facing aircraft shortage. Then the
best option would be to place the CAP station at 30 N.M. because Figure 8 shows
that this is the CAP range yielding the least casualty level for the CAP interceptors.
If the intention is to inflict as many casualties to the attackers as possible, then
Figure 7 shows that the best tactic would be to station the CAP at the 50 N.M. range
because this option renders the highest attackers's casualties level in the time. If the
defense knows about the attacking air force aircraft inventory levels, then the plot
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of MOE3 is useful because it gives an idea of the casualties relationship between
both sides, allowing some kind of forecasting capability to the air defense planners.
If it is the case that the anti-air weapons system is under some kind of constraint,
then Figure 10 picturing MOE4 can show the option rendering the least CAP leakage
rate.
The above considerations about the uses of the model's results apply in the
very same way to scenario 2, or to any kind of scenario where the reality of 'nter,-st
is represented in the model's parameters. It is also a useful tool to evaluate the
performance of two distinct tactic options in the same scenario. As it becomes clear
from these numerical examples, the use of supersonic intercepts in scenario 2 is not
the most effective tactic for the defense'.
6 With this regard it must be pointed out that in this numerical examples, "subsonic"
means the interceptor flying at Mach Number 0.92, and "supersonic" means that the
interceptor is flying at Mach Number 1.2.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
This study is an investigation of the Combat Air Patrol stationing problem in
the tactical scenario. The geometry of a hypothetical scenario was analyzed and
equation (3.7) was derived to determine the minimum early warning radar detection
range required for intercept feasibility in a generic scenario. This equation considers
any air speed relationship between the attacker and interceptor aircraft, and assumes
the air base located either inside or outside of the target area. Using this expression
the necessity of using the interceptors in CAP in a given situation can be identified.
Considering an interceptor in Combat Air Patrol in a given position, equation
(3.8) was derived to express the intercept range as measured from the target area
position as a function of: the early warning detection range; the system's
identification time; the distance of the CAP station from the target position; the
.interceptor/attacker air speed relationship; and the attacker's flight path angle, as
measured with respect to the CAP station position.
The minimum number of interceptors required to activate one CAP station was
addressed. For this end equation (3.13) was derived and expresses this number as a
function of the time variables involved in the dynamic process that a CAP station
management represents. These time variables were investigated and the maximum
time for combat (tcb) and the maximum time on CAP station (tin) were identified
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as the key variables for analysis. In addressing these two time variables, the fuel
consumption problem had to be considered.
The analysis regarding tcmb dealt with the aircraft maneuverability and turning
performance comparisons based on the energy-state approximation theory; a heuristic
method for computing temb which relates this time length to an expected interceptor's
performance during the air-to-air combat engagement was postulated. The time
length determined this way is translated into an amount of fuel and into a distance
measure according to equation (3.15), and these two quantities are used in the air
defense planning process. In the analysis of tm the interceptor/attacker air speed
relationship was identified as a factor that ultimately affects the number of aircraft
required to activate one CAP station. A third party investigation result was presented
showing that high settings of intercept air speed is of little value for the intercept
distance.
In order to capture the complexities present in the dynamic process embedded
in a Combat Air Patrol management, a deterministic model representing such a
process was developed. The state variables of this model were defined so as to
portray both the logistic and the operational aspects and constraints of such an
activity. These types of realities are represented in the model by means of the
system's parameters controlling the transition flow from one state to another. A
method for computing the attrition rate was derived based on Bonder and Farrell's
methodology. Numerical examples considering two different scenarios and three
distinct situations were presented and the results analyzed. The utility of such model
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for the CAP problem analysis in an air defense planning process was addressed. The
model is preliminary and will require further work to become to become an useful
planning tool.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The interceptor's fuel consumption characteristics were identified as one
dominant factor in the analysis of the CAP stationing problem. One way of improving
a CAP interceptor fuel capability is to resort to air refueling. Such a possibility was
not considered in the present study and neither was it represented in the
deterministic macro model. The impact of the air refueling option in the overall CAP
interceptor performance is worth additional study.
A key assumption to compute the attrit - n rate coefficients for the deterministic
model is that the interceptor aircraft uses al its ammunition in each engagement.
This assumption is reasonable depending on the air-air weapons load capabilities of
the interceptor aircraft represented in the model and led to a simplified method of
attrition rate computation. If such assumption is relaxed a greater variety of aircraft
could be represented in the model. However such relaxation would require that the
method used here to compute the attrition rates be revised; this is recommended for
further analysis.
The deterministic macro model for CAP management was applied in numerical
examples for which the scenarios considered the air base supporting one single CAP
station activated, and an homogeneous type of threat. T'he issue of multi-threat
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sectors covered by CAP interceptors supported by a single air base is worth
addressing in order to assess the effects of resource allocation and priority policies
on the overall efficiency of the CAP interceptors in different sectors of threat.
C. CONCLUSIONS
The present investigation has shown that to decide on a better way to station
interceptor aircraft in Combat Air Patrol in a tactical scenario defended by an
Integrated Air Defense System, requires an analysis that considers many different
factors. Some of these factors are scenario-dependent, others are functions of the
characteristics of the resources available. A judicious decision process must take into
account dhe interactions between these different elements of the problem and identify
those most significant for the measure of effectiveness selected.
The present study identified the interceptor's fuel usage characteristics as a
dominant factor in all aspects of the problem. All time variables identified as being
to some extent germane to the problem are subject to fuel constraints. The maximum
length of time the interceptor can stay on CAP station, and the time available for air-
to-air combat engagement, are the time variables with the greatest relevance in the
CAP interceptor performance. The former because it impacts the demand of aircraft
for the CAP mission, and the latter because it affects the interceptor's lethality.
There is not a unique solution for a problem with so many facets. A
deterministic macro model using the mean values of the variables involved was
developed in an attempt to shed light on the interactions among the logistics and the
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operational variables present in the phenomenon. It was shown that in a tactical
environment, the use of high values for the intercept air speed decreases the CAP
interceptor overall contribution for the air defense mission. In spite of approximate
nature of the results, the model developed may be adapted to be useful for many




In what follows there is a description of some additional air-to-air models found
in the review of the unclassified literature.
Riecks [Ref. 14] addressed the interactions between airborne interceptors and
penetrators in two distinct models. The main purpose of these models is to evaluate
a bomber's defensive missiles as penetration aids to bombers carrying cruise missiles.
The scenario for both models utilizes the corridor penetration concept, in which the
bombers enter a corridor covered by the Forward Air Defense (FAD) comprising a
single Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) controlling airborne
interceptors on CAP. One model is a simulation using the Q-GERT simulation
language, in which the battle is represented as a queue system where bombers and
interceptors wait on queue to be paired by the AWACS who acts as server. The
other model is a stochastic analytic approach recursively estimating a separate
survival probability for each successive bomber to enter the corridor. The analytical
model derives expressions to compute quantities such as:
P.(J), the probability that a bomber survives, given j Al engagements; [Ref. 14:pp.
66-73]
E (i), the expected number of penetrators (bombers and Air Launched Cruise
issiles - ALCM) in AWACS coverage during the ith bomber's attempt to
penetrate the FAD;[Ref. 14:pp. 73-80]
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Ni(i), the expected number of fighters alive during the ith bomber's time in
coverage;[Ref. 14:pp. 81-87]
Pj(i,k), the probability that k is the maximum number of intercepts that can be
attempted against the it bomber;[Ref. 14:pp. 88-891
E.,, the estimated total number of ALCM's launched;[Ref. 14:pp. 90-91] and
E., the expected number of cruise missiles surviving.[Ref. 14:p. 92]
In both models the AI's are considered to be on CAP station at the same positions
as the AWACS, and the air base is located at a given distance from the CAP. The
model captures many aspects of a many versus many air-to-air engagement, including
defense saturation. Nevertheless, the effect of air base-CAP station distance is not
analyzed.
Clements [Ref. 9] analyzes another aspect of the air-to-air battle, namely the
maximum number of interceptors that can be simultaneously controlled in a theater
tactical air defense scenario. According to the author, this number was needed by the
Air Force Center for Studies and Analysis as an input variable for their new theater
air combat simulation, TAC ALLOCATOR. To this end, the author used data
"collected in a survey amongst USAFs air weapons controllers. The analysis of the
research questionnaire indicated that the average air weapons controller is capable
of simultaneously controlling either 3.41 or 4.71 flights of interceptors depending on
the interceptor on-board radar capability [Ref. 9:p. 5-2]. Using these results a
computer simulation was designed in which the scenario represented was a Central
European theater. In this scenario many CAP stations were considered
simultaneously, but the CAP locations were not specifically addressed in the study.
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A 2-factor experimental design was run and the conclusion was that if no
radar/communications jamming is considered, if the penetrators do not have lethal
self-defense capability, and if the enemy raids are uniformly distributed throughout
the theater, then the multiplication of the control capability of the average air
weapons controller by the number of controllers available accurately predicts the
maximum centrol capability of the system [Ref. 9:p. 6-2]
Next we have a general description of the main characteristics of some air-to-
air models found in a research made by Grant [Ref. 3].
Advanced Penetration Model (APM) Is a model developed by the Boeing
Corporation for Headquarters USAF in the early 70's. It models all aspects of the
bomber mission: takeoff, base fly out, refueling, forward air defense, SAM zones,
terminal and point defenses, weapons delivery at target and recovery at a friendly air
base.The model features two major segments: the Mission Planner which is used to
define the overall scenario and generates the individual flight plans, and the Air
Battle Simulator which implements, in time sequence, the events that which have
been specified in the mission planner and inserts others as required by deterministic
or probabilistic event assignment. According to the author, APM produces a great
amount of information in the form of a time history of each event, allowing the user
to examine defense saturation, command and control limitations and weapons
assignment policies. On the other hand, this detail is also a model weakness:
opportunity for multiple replications is limited because of computer time costs.[Ref.
3:pp. 6-7]
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Simulation of Penetrators Encountering Extensive Defenses (SPEED) This
model was developed by Calspan Corporation in order to be a fast running, smaller
scale version of the APM. It addresses only the part of the bomber mission dealing
with the forward air defense. The offensive elements include manned bombers,
guided missiles, drones, decoys and short range missiles and bombs. The defensive
elements include a C2 netting of early warning (EW),
ground control intercept (GCI) radars, and a zone operations center (ZOC). The
ZOC pairs penetrators with interceptors. AWACS aircraft orbits between two points
at an altitude defined by the user. There is a CAP associated with the AWACS from
which the AWACS assigns interceptors to the penetrators it detects. The model
assesses the efficiency of the interceptors by the percentage of time bombers are
engaged by interceptors and the percentage of time bombers are not engaged owing
to time delays in the defense C2 system, ECM effects, or saturation of the
communication channels for the interceptors. According to the author, a weakness
of the SPEED is the number and detail of the parameters which the user must
-provide.[Ref. 3:pp. 7-8]
FISHER or STRAT DEFENDER This model was developed by William
Fisher of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Later
modifications introduced by AF/SD (Strategic Aerospace Defense Division) HQ
USAF led to renaming the model as STRAT DEFENDER. It is a simulation model
addressing forward air defense involving unarmed penetrators against fighters and
SAM defenses. Aspects such as radar cross-section, speed, altitude and other
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features of the penetrators, detection and armament capabilities of the interceptors,
and detection range of the AWACS and GCI are taken into account to decide if a
penetrator is liable to interception. Interceptors are vectored from CAP and from air
bases to the penetrator, and detection, conversion and kill actions are determined
stochastically. The model also includes aspects such air base location and their
effects on interceptor fuel and armament requirements.[Ref. 3:pp. 8-9]
STRAT PATROLLER This model was developed by General Research
Corporation for AF/SD, HQ USAF, in 1979. It is an event-based simulation of
interceptors flying air surveillance, and is intended to provide an autonomous
interceptor modeling facility to the FISHER model. The major focus of the model
is the detection function of a surveillance barrier. According to the author, by the
time her research was being done, STRAT PATROLLER was still in
development.[Ref. 3:p. 9-10]
PENEX This is an analytic model which, using principles of probability theory,
calculates the expected number of bombers surviving in a many-on-many air battle
with manned interceptors. The scenario comprises a corridor in which the air battle
takes place. The penetrators have identical performance, may carry decoys to be
released along the way, and neither bombers or decoys will fire at the interceptors.
The interceptors are all identical to one another and they can not distinguish
between bombers and decoys. Command and control is modeled according two
different philosophies: raid control and close control. One weakness of the model,
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according to the author, is that it does not model interceptor availability as a
function of time or the number of control channels available.[Ref. 3:pp. 10-11]
COLLIDE This is an analytical penetration model developed by Decision
Science Applications for AF/SD HQ USAF, in 1972. It models the air-to-air combat
according four submodels: a detection model; a conversion model; a command and
control model; and an ECM model. It focuses on finding the probabilities of
detection, conversion and kill based on a one-to-one encounter. To compute each
one of these probabilities it takes into account factors as altitude differences, type of
sensor, relative velocities, angularly dependent probability of kill and ECM effects.
The considerations of all these details in computing the probabilities makes the
strength of this model. On the other hand, according to the author, the fact that it
models a one-on-one encounter makes it difficult to expand the model into a many-
on-many scenario as in the FAD models.[Ref. 3:pp. 11-12]
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